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TOWARD A TIME-OF-DISCOVERY RULE FOR
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN LATENT
INJURY CASES IN NEW YORK STATE
I. Introduction
The large number of personal injury suits' filed by persons
exposed to substances identified as known or suspected cancer-causing
agents in humans2 requires a reevaluation of the statutes of limitations
governing such suits in New York State. Traditional statutes of
limitations begin to run when a cause of action first could have
been maintained by the plaintiff.' Normally, the wrongful act and
injury occur simultaneously. For example, if a defendant negligently
slams a door on a plaintiff's hand, the plaintiff has a cause of
action at the moment the door was slammed. However, when the
wrongful act and injury do not occur simultaneously, as in the case
1. Asbestos companies such as Eagle-Picher, Owens-Illinois and Owens-Corning
Fiberglas are named defendants in approximately 500 suits per month. Lewin, Business
and the Law: Burdensome Asbestos Cases, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1984, at D2, col.
1. 1983 and 1984 studies by the Rand Corporation estimated that there may be 74,000
to 265,000 asbestos related deaths over the next thirty years. Riley, Asbestos: New
Approaches, Nat'l L.J., May 7, 1984, at 25, col. 1. At the time of the Rand studies,
20,000 to 24,000 claims were pending as most states had decided only twenty percent
of their asbestos cases. Id.
Numerous claims also have been filed against manufacturers of certain hazardous
medical devices. A.H. Robins Company, for example, has already spent $101 million
in litigation expenses arising from the sale of 4.6 million Dalkon Shield intrauterine
contraception devices sold between 1970 and 1974. Kleinfield, Ongoing Problem
for Robins, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1984, at D1, col. 2. Robins' insurer has paid
out an additional $132 million, and Robins receives approximately thirty new claims
each week. Id. Robins recently settled two hundred such claims for $38 million
with an average settlement per plaintiff of approximately $192,000. Accord Cited
in Dalkon Cases, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1984, at A18, col. 5.
2. There are over one hundred such chemicals currently identified. Boffey,
After Years of Cancer Alarms, Progress Amid the Mistakes, N.Y. Times, Mar.
20, 1984, at C13, col. 4. Federal action has resulted in the regulation of several
toxic substances. Asbestos, for example, used in clothing, spray-on fire proofing,
wall board and electric hair dryers, is regulated by the Environmental Protection
Agency under the Asbestos Standard. National Emission Standards for Hazardous
Air Pollutants; Amendments to Asbestos Standard, 40 C.F.R. § 61.140-156 (1984).
See generally Anderson, Human Welfare and the Administered Society: Federal
Regulation in the 1970s to Protect Health, Safety, and the Environment, in EN-
VIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 835-64 (W. Rom 1st ed. 1983) [here-
inafter cited as OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE].
3. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 165-68 (5th
ed. 1984); see infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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of injury from inhalation of asbestos fibers,' ingestion of carcin-
ogenic drugs5 or absorption of a toxic substance into the body, 6 an
injured plaintiff is faced with a complex problem: if the toxic
substance produces injury which manifests itself several years after
plaintiff's initial exposure to the substance, 7 when does the cause
of action accrue? The various judicial and legislative responses include
decisions that the statute of limitations accrues when the wrongful
act occurs,8 when the plaintiff is actually injured, 9 when the plaintiff
discovers the injury, 10 and when the plaintiff discovers the causal
connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct."
In a jurisdiction where the cause of action accrues upon discovery
of the injury,' 2 a toxic tort victim usually will be able to file a
timely claim. However, a plaintiff with a latent disease who com-
mences an action in a jurisdiction which has adopted either a "strict
4. See infra notes 194-204 for discussion of cases involving asbestos inhalation.
5. See infra notes 205-21 for discussion of cases involving DES ingestion.
6. See infra notes 172-83 for discussion of a case involving absorption of a
toxic substance into the body.
7. A latent disease is a disease which does not manifest itself for a period of
years following first exposure to the disease-causing agent. N. SAX, CANCER CAUSING
CHEMICALS 23 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CANCER CHEMICALS]. Exposure to toxic
substances may result in diseases which have latency periods between twenty and
thirty years. B. AMES, ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS CAUSING CANCER AND GENETIC
BIRTH DEFECTS 1 (1978). For a discussion of statute of limitations problems regarding
asbestos exposure, as well as other asbestos litigation problems, see generally
Comment, An Examination of Recurring Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 46 ALB. L.
REV. 1307 (1982).
8. A "strict accrual" approach requires that the statute begin running at the
plaintiff's first contact with the harmful substance whether or not injury had, in
fact, occurred or had been discovered at that time. Birnbaum, "First Breath's"
Last Gasp: The Discovery Rule in Products Liability Cases, 13 FORUM 279, 281
(1977) [hereinafter cited as First Breath]. See infra notes 163-71 and accompanying
text.
9. Plaintiff's cause of action begins when the inhaled, ingested or absorbed
substance actually causes harm to body tissue. See infra notes 104-54 and accom-
panying text.
10. Plaintiff's cause of action begins after the disease manifests itself. See infra
notes 53-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the initial development of
the time-of-discovery rule.
11. See Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 171, 371 A.2d 170, 174
(1977) (plaintiff's claim against drug company for damages from oral contraceptive
does not accrue until plaintiff discovers, or, in exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered both injury and that injury was caused by defendant's
conduct); Note, Statutes of Limitations and the Discovery Rule in Latent Injury
Claims: An Exception or the Law?, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 501, 503 (1982).
12. See infra note 41 for a list of such jurisdictions.
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accrual"1 3 or "time-of-injury accrual ' 14 theory, is often faced with
the insurmountable hurdle of having to file his claim several years
before he even knows he has been injured. 15
New York State has adhered to a strict accrual rule 6 in latent
injury cases, finding that an injured plaintiff's cause of action
begins when the wrongful act occurs.'" The New York State Court
of Appeals, in Martin v. Edwards Laboratories8 and Fleishman v.
Eli Lilly & Co.,19 recently affirmed the strict accrual statute of
limitations rule for latent disease caused by inhalation, ingestion or
injection of toxic substances. 20 Additionally, legislation introduced
13. See infra notes 163-71 and accompanying text for discussion of strict accrual
in New York State.
14. The time-of-injury accrual theory recognizes the accrual period as beginning
when injury has in fact occurred, not when it has in fact been discovered. See
infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text for those states which have either strict
accrual or time-of-injury statutes of limitations which bar a claimant with a latent
disease.
15. One judge commented:
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are conceived, or
be divorced before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or
burn down a house never built or miss a train running on a non-existent
railroad. . . . [I]t has always heretofore been accepted, . . . that a
statute of limitations does not begin to run against a cause of action
before that cause of action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available
to the plaintiff. . . . [T]he policy behind a limitations statute is that of
penalizing one who " 'sleep[s] upon his rights' ". But no student of
legal somnolence has ever explained how a man can sleep on a right he
does not have.
Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J.
dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Consolidated Motor Lines v. M & M Transp.
Co., 128 Conn. 107, 108, 20 A.2d 621, 622 (1941)).
16. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 155-226 and accompanying text. See also First Breath, supra
note 8, at 281. A corollary issue which will not be discussed in this Note is whether
a defendant's coverage under a liability insurance policy is triggered upon exposure
to a toxic substance or after there has been manifestation of disease. See, e.g.,
American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1498
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (coverage triggered upon initial exposure).
18. 60 N.Y.2d 417, 457 N.E.2d 1150, 469 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1983). See infra notes
123-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Martin. A recent lower court
opinion has reflected adherence to a strict accrual approach. See, e.g., Goldsmith
v. Howmedica, Inc., 123 Misc. 2d 473, 473 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1984). But cf. Aranoff v. Winthrop Laboratories, 102 A.D.2d 736, 736-
37, 476 N.Y.S.2d 571, 573 (1st Dep't 1984) (though injections administered between
1969 and 1976 in action commenced in 1977, court affirmed judgment against
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment).
19. 62 N.Y.2d 888, 467 N.E.2d 517, 478 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1984). See infra notes
205-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of Fleishman.
20. See infra notes 123-54, 205-26 and accompanying text for discussion of
Martin and Fleishman.
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in the New York State Senate2 which would extend the time-of-
discovery rule to all toxic tort victims has thus far been rejected.22
This Note analyzes the development of the statute of limitations
for toxic exposure injuries in various jurisdictions and the policy
arguments for adopting different theories of accrual.23 This Note
then analyzes the development of the statute of limitations in latent
injury actions in New York State and examines the consequences of
the Martin and Fleishman decisions. 4 Finally, this Note argues
that judicial or legislative adoption of a time-of-discovery theory of
accrual is essential in the area of toxic tort suits in New York
State .21
II. Current State Product Liability Statutes of Limitations
Early English common law courts recognized perpetual rights of
action in contract and tort.2 6 English courts did not restrict perpetual
actions until the Limitation Acts of 154027 and 1623.28 In the English
courts before the passage of the Limitation Act, any undue burdening
of defendants which may have resulted from perpetual actions was
offset by complex procedural requirements which discouraged as-
sertion of stale claims. 29 However, as access to the courts became
less restricted, the judiciary sought ways to eliminate inconsequential
21. See infra notes 261-89 and accompanying text.
22. Id.; see also infra notes 227-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the present time-of-discovery statute of limitations rule which applies exclusively
to Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange.
23. See infra notes 26-88 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 89-260 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 261-310 and accompanying text.
26. Note, Developments in the Law-Statute of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV.
1177, 1177-78 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
27. 32 Hen. 8, ch. 2 (1540). This Act applied to real property actions only:
"[A]I formedons in reverter [or] in remainder ... shall be sued, used and taken
within fifty years next after that the title and cause of action fallen, and at no
time after the said fifty years passed." Id.; see Comment, Judicial Encroachment
on Statutes of Limitation, 34 YALE L.J. 432, 433-34 (1925) [hereinafter cited as
Judicial Encroachment].
28. Jac. 1, ch. 16 (1623). This Act extended the statute of limitations to personal
actions: "[A]ctions of trespass, of assault, battery, wounding, imprisonment .. .
within one year next after the end of this present session of parliament, or within
four years next after the cause of such actions or suits." Id. Subsequent early
Limitation Acts included 4 Anne, ch. 16 (1705) (extended statute to writs of
mandamus); 16 & 17 Vict., ch. 113, § 20 (1853) (amended personal action limitations)
and 19 & 20 Vict., ch. 97 (1856) (limitations pertaining to joint debtors). See
Judicial Encroachment, supra note 27, at 434.
29. See Developments, supra note 26, at 1177-78. "[A]ctions in tort did not
survive either the plaintiff or the defendant, and the formalities of the covenant
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claims and to protect indigent defendants.30 Thus, the Limitation
Acts of 1540 and 1623 were promulgated, establishing time periods
for various forms of action. 3' Most of the early United States colonial
legislatures subsequently adopted the English Acts with little alter-
ation.12
Modern statutes of limitations in the United States generally
begin to run, in personal injury actions, when an individual's right
of action first accrues, 33 but only a few of the state statutes define
"accrual." '3 4 The question of when a cause of action begins to accrue
has been determined judicially due to the absence of legislative
designation. 35 Thus, the New York State Court of Appeals has held
36
that a plaintiff's cause of action accrues in toxic substance cases upon
a person's initial exposure to the substance.37 However, as the need
were themselves evidence of the existence of the obligation." Id. at 1178; see also
Atkinson, Some Procedural Aspects of the Statute of Limitations, 27 COLUM. L.
REV. 157 (1927) [hereinafter cited as Procedural Aspects).
30. Suits were often barred upon the occurrence of a "notable event" such as
the coronation of a king or the end of a queen's journey to a foreign land. See
Judicial Encroachment, supra note 27, at 433. In the case of an "appeal of wounding
or mayhem," the victim had to show that his wounds were still fresh. See Procedural
Aspects, supra note 29, at 157 n.1. A woman wishing to bring an appeal of rape
was required to report her injury to the chief officer of the nearest village and to
show him the wounds and torn garments before complaining in the nearest county
court. Id.; see also Developments, supra note 26, at 1178; T. PLUCKNETT, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 173-74 (5th ed. 1956) (act passed in 1601,
43 Eliz., ch. 6, prevented successful plaintiff from recovering expenses if damages
were less than forty shillings-this Act reduced the case load in courts at West-
minster).
31. Developments, supra note 26, at 1178. The statute of limitations for actions
of trespass quare clausum fregit was six years; for assault and battery-four years;
for actions on the case for words (defamation)-two years. Note, Wilson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp. and Statutes of Limitations in Latent Injury Litigation: An
Equitable Expansion of the Discovery Rule, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 471, 474, n.15
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Latent Injury Litigation]; see also Kelley, The Discovery
Rule for Personal Injury Statutes of Limitations: Reflections on the British Ex-
perience, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1641 (1978), in which Professor Kelley notes that the
shorter statutes of limitations reflected general disapproval of personal injury actions
filed many years after the injury occurred. Id. at 1646.
32. For further analysis of the history of the statute of limitations through the
present, see Latent Injury Litigation, supra note 31, at 473-83.
33. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
34. The states defining accrual statutorily in time-of-discovery terms are: Al-
abama, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, North Carolina, South
Carolina and Vermont. See infra note 41 for citations to these statutes.
35. See infra note 45 for those states which have adopted a time-of-discovery
rule judicially.
36. Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824
(1936).
37. Id. at 302, 200 N.E. at 827-28. See infra notes 163-71 and accompanying
text for further discussion of Schmidt.
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to protect indigent defendants3" has decreased and the need to balance
the equities in favor of plaintiffs has increased,39 legislatures and courts
have begun to carve exceptions into the time-of-injury accrual rule
which define accrual in time-of-discovery terms." °
Thirty-five jurisdictions, including Puerto Rico, have adopted time-
of-discovery rules applicable in personal injury and products liability
actions for latent disease injury as well as in medical malpractice
actions.4" Another six jurisdictions have adopted time-of-discovery
38. See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
39. Id.
40. One early commentator noted that while courts professed to adhere strictly
to the statutory exceptions to limitations of actions, "[T]he equitable influence had
seemed to prevail in extending relief to claimants who would otherwise be barred."
Judicial Encroachment, supra note 27, at 435; see, e.g., Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal.
477, 493-94, 89 P. 317, 323-24 (1907) (in case of mistake, statute does not begin
to run until actual discovery of mistake or time when such discovery should have
been discovered with reasonable diligence); Howard v. Carter, 71 Kan. 85, 90-91,
80 P. 61, 63 (1905) (statute does not begin to run until duress ceases); Gillette v.
Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 127, 65 N.E. 865, 872 (1902) (in medical malpractice
action statute runs only after the professional relationship terminated and negligence
discovered).
For a discussion of the viability of a statute of repose, see Martin, A Statute
of Repose for Product Liability Claims, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 745 (1982). A statute
of repose differs from a statute of limitations in that the statute of repose puts
an outer limit on the existence of the obligation itself; a statute of limitations
merely puts a time limit on plaintiff's right to seek a remedy. A statute of limitations
bars the remedy but not the right. See Hulbert v. Clark, 128 N.Y. 295, 297, 28
N.E. 638, 638 (1891) (lien on property not impaired because remedy at law for
recovery of debt is barred by statute). However, a time-of-discovery statute of
limitations with a short statute of repose may still bar latent injury plaintiffs from
obtaining a remedy. A statute of repose, if enacted by an omnibus product liability
statute, should have a latent injury exception to avoid this consequence. The proposed
National Product Liability Act contains such an exception. See infra note 84 and
accompanying text. See infra notes 41 and 43-45 for those states which have
promulgated statutes of respose.
41. See ALA. CODE § 6-2-39 (1975) (one-year personal injury), § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1984)
(one-year product liability limitation with ten-year repose, i.e., plaintiff has no right of
action ten-years after sale/manufacture by defendant), § 6-5-482 (1975) (two-year med-
ical malpractice); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-542 (1982) (two-year personal injury), §
12-551 (1982) (three-year product liability limitations with twelve year repose), § 12-564
(1982) (three-year medical malpractice); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-206 (1962) (three-year
personal injury), § 34-2616 (one- to two-year medical malpractice) (Supp. 1983); CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 340 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984) (one-year personal injury), § 340.5
(West 1982) (one- to three-year medical malpractice), § 340.2 (West 1982) (one-year for
asbestos); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584 (1983) (two-year personal injury with three-year
repose), § 52-577(a) (1983) (three-year product liability limitation with ten-year repose);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8119 (1974) (two-year personal injury), tit. 18, § 6856 (Supp.
1982) (two-year medical malpractice limitation with three-year repose); FLA. STAT. § 95.031
(West 1982) (four-year product liability limitation with twelve-year repose), § 95.11(4)
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(West 1982) (two-year medical malpractice limitation with four- to seven-year repose);
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-33 (1982) (two-year personal injury), § 9-3-71 (1982) (two-year
medical malpractice); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 657-7 (1976) (two-year personal injury), §
657-7.3 (Supp. 1983) (two-year medical malpractice limitation with six-year repose); IDAHO
CODE § 5-219 (1979) (two-year personal injury and medical malpractice limitation), § 6-
1303 (Supp. 1984) (two-year product liability limitation), § 5-243 (1979) (three- to thirty-
year ionizing radiation injury); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-202 (Smith-Hurd 1984) (two-
year personal injury), ch. 110, § 13-213 (Smith-Hurd 1984) (two-year product liability
limitation with eight- to twelve-year repose), ch. 110, § 13-212 (Smith-Hurd 1984) (two-
year medical malpractice limitation with four-year repose); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1
(West 1950 & Supp. 1984-1985) (two-year personal injury and two-year medical mal-
practice limitation with six-year repose); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(4) (1983) (two-
year personal injury time-of-discovery limitation with ten-year repose), § 60-513(a)(7)
(1983) (two-year medical malpractice), § 60-513(c) (1983) (four-year medical malpractice
repose), § 60-513(a)(6) (1983) (two-year ionizing radiation limitation with ten-year re-
pose); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.140 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1984) (one-year per-
sonal injury), § 413.140 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1984) (one-year medical malpractice
limitation with five-year repose); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3492 (West Supp. 1984) (one-
year personal injury), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628 (West 1983) (one-year medical mal-
practice limitation with three-year repose); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752 (1964)
(six-year tort), tit. 14, § 753 (1964) (two-year medical malpractice); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984) (three-year personal injury), § 5-109 (1984) (three-year medical
malpractice limitation with five-year repose); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 2A (Michie/
Law. Co-op. 1980) (three-year personal injury), ch. 260, § 4 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980
& Supp. 1984) (three-year medical malpractice); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805
(West 1968 & Supp. 1984-1985) (three-year personal injury), § 600.5805 (West Supp. 1984-
1985) (three-year product liability limitation with ten-year repose), § 600.5805 (West 1968
& Supp. 1984-1985) (two-year medical malpractice); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05 (West
Supp. 1984) (six-year personal injury and four-year product liability), § 541.07 (West
1947 & Supp. 1984) (two-year medical malpractice); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 516.100, 516.120
(1959) (five-year personal injury), Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.105 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (two-
year medical malpractice limitation with ten-year repose); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4
(1983) (six-year personal injury), § 507-D:2 (1983) (three-year product liability limitation
with twelve-year repose), § 507-C:4 (1983) (two-year medical malpractice limitation); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1952) (two-year personal injury); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52
(16) (1983) (three-year personal injury), § 1-15(c) (1983) (one- to three-year medical mal-
practice limitation with four- to ten-year repose); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West
1960 & Supp. 1983-1984) (two-year personal injury), tit. 76, § 18 (West Supp. 1983-1984)
(two-year medical malpractice limitation with three-year repose); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905
(1981) (two-year product liability limitation with eight year repose), § 12.110 (1981) (two-
year personal injury), § 12.110(4) (1981) (two-year medical malpractice limitation with
five-year repose), § 12.115 (1981) (ten-year personal injury repose); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5524 (Purdon 1981 & Supp. 1984-1985) (two-year tort); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31,
§ 5298 (1968) (one-year personal injury); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530 (Law. Co-op. 1976
& Supp. 1983), § 15-3-535 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983) (six-year personal injury), § 15-3-
545 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983) (three-year medical malpractice limitation with six-year
repose); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1980) (one-year tort), § 29-28-103 (1980) (one- to
six-year product liability limitation with ten-year repose and limitation exception for as-
bestos), § 29-26-116 (1980) (one-year medical malpractice limitation with three-year re-
pose); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1984) (two-year
personal injury), art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (two-year medical malpractice);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 512 (1973 & Supp. 1984) (three-year personal injury), tit. 12, §
521 (Supp. 1984) (two- to three-year medical malpractice limitation with seven-year re-
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rules limited to latent diseases caused by specific toxic substances. 42
Of the remaining jurisdictions with no time-of-discovery rule ap-
plicable to latent injury, six have a time-of-discovery rule limited
to medical malpractice actions.43 Thus, forty-seven jurisdictions have
some form of time-of-discovery statute of limitations rule."
Though the vast majority of these jurisdictions have adopted such
rules by judicial decision, the New York State Court of Appeals has
refused to adopt a more liberal statute of limitations rule arguing
pose), tit. 12, § 518 (1973) (three- to twenty-year ionizing radiation injury limitation);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.080(2) (1962) (three-year personal injury), § 4.16.350
(Supp. 1984-1985) (three-year medical malpractice limitation with eight-year repose); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 893.54 (West 1983) (three-year personal injury); Wyo. STAT. § 1-3-105(a)
(1977) (four-year personal injury), § 1-3-107 (1977) (two-year medical malpractice); see
also McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in Product
Liability Actions: Present and Future, 16 FORUM 416, 438-43 (1980).
42. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224 (Supp. 1981) (accrues when an employee is informed
by competent medical authority of discovery of asbestos-related injury); N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
LAW § 214-b (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984) (diseases from Agent Orange exposure); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02(4) (Supp. 1983) (three year time-of-discovery limitation for as-
bestos injury); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page Supp. 1982) (two-year time-of-
discovery when injury caused by asbestos, chromium, or, for Vietnam veterans, Agent
Orange); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14.2 (Supp. 1984) (three-year time-of-discovery for Agent
Orange injury); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (1981) (two-year time-of-discovery limitation for
asbestos injury and injury from exposure at coke works); accord Pauley v. Combustion
Engineering, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 759, 765 (S.D.W.Va. 1981) (action accrues when plain-
tiff knows existence and cause of asbestos injury).
43. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-105 (Supp. 1983) (two-year limitation with three-year
repose); Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (Supp. 1984) (two-year limitation); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-2-205 (1983) (three-year limitation with five-year repose); NEV. REV. STAT. §
41A.097 (1981) (two-year limitation with four-year repose); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 15-2-14.1 (Supp. 1983) (two-year limitation); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4 (1953 & Supp.
1983) (two-year limitation with four-year repose).
44. Only five jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, have no time-of-dis-
covery provision in their statutes of limitations. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983)
(two-year personal injury); D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301 (1981) (three-year personal in-
jury); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1982) (three-year personal injury), § 41-5-13 (1982)
(three-year medical malpractice); VA. CODE § 8.01-243 (1984) (two-year personal injury),
§ 8.01-230 (accrual expressly at time of injury, not time of discovery).
45. Of thirty-four states which have adopted personal injury time-of-discovery
rules, twenty-five have done so judicially. See Long v. Buckley, 129 Ariz. 141,
143, 629 P.2d 557, 559 (1981) (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-542 (1982) (tort claim
accrues when plaintiff knows or should know of defendant's negligent acts));
Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 368, 375-76 (E.D. Ark. 1968)
(ARK. STAT ANN. § 37-206 (1962) (accrues when plaintiff knows or should know
that harm occurs)), aff'd, 423 F.2d 919, 924-25 (8th Cir. 1970); G.D. Searle v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 25, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 220 (1975) (CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 340 (West 1982) (accrues when plaintiff knows or should know
the cause of injury)); Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794, 798 (Del. 1968) (DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 8119 (1974) (accrues when harmful effect first manifests itself
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and becomes physically ascertainable)); Ballew v. A.H. Robins Co., 688 F.2d 1325,
1327 (lth Cir. 1982) (GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-33 (1982) (accrues when plaintiff
knew, or should have discovered, the causal connection between the injury and
negligence of defendant)); Basque v. Yuk Lin Liau, 50 Hawaii 397, 399, 441 P.2d
636, 637 (1968) (HAWAII REV. STAT. § 657-7 (1976) (personal injury and property
damage statute accrues when plaintiff knows or should have known actionable
wrong has been committed)); Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos & Magnesia Ma-
terials Co., 74 Il. App. 3d 788, 788, 392 N.E.2d 1352, 1360 (1979) (ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 13-202) (Smith-Hurd 1984) (accrues when plaintiff discovers injury)),
aff'd, 85 111. 2d 161, 421 N.E.2d 864 (1981); Franzen v. Deere, 334 N.W.2d 730,
732 (Iowa 1983) (IowA CODE ANN. § 614.1 (West 1950 & Supp. 1984-1985) (accrues
when plaintiff discovers or should have discovered injury)); Louisville Trust Co.
v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Ky. 1979) (Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 413.140 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1984) (accrues from date of discovery
of injury)); Owens v. Martin, 449 So.2d 448, 451 n.4 (La. 1984) (dictum) (LA.
CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3492 (West Supp. 1984) (accrues from time plaintiff knew
of his injury)); Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 342 A.2d 712, 718 (Me. 1975) (ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752 (1964) (product liability action accrues when injury
occurs)); Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 76-77, 394 A.2d 299,
303 (1978) (MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984) (accrues when
plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong)); Olsen v. Bell Tel.
Laboratories, Inc., 388 Mass. 171, 175, 445 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1983) (MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 260, § 2A (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980) (accrues when plaintiff discovers
that disease contracted as result of defendant's conduct)); Lefever v. American Red
Cross, 108 Mich. App. 69, 72, 310 N.W.2d 278, 280, (1981) (MIcH. ComP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.5805 (West 1968 & Supp. 1984-1985) (accrues when all elements of
cause of action have occurred)); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d
155, 160-61 (8th Cir. 1975); Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280 Minn. 147, 152-53,
158 N.W.2d 580, 584 (1968) (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05 (West Supp. 1984) (accrues
when plaintiff knows or should have known of his injury)); Raymond v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 117 N.H. 164, 169-76, 371 A.2d 170, 172-77 (1977) (N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 508:4 (1983) (accrues when plaintiff discovers injury and causation)); Lopez
v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272-73, 300 A.2d 563, 566 (1973); Jarusewicz v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 188 N.J. Super. 638, 643, 458 A.2d 156, 158 (1983) (N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1952) (accrues when plaintiff knew or should have
known of his cause of action)); Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731, 734 (10th
Cir. 1980) (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West 1960 & Supp. 1983-1984) (accrues
when plaintiff knows or should know of injury and who caused it)); Schiele v.
Hobart Corp., 284 Or. 483, 490, 587 P.2d 1010, 1014 (1978) (OR. REV. STAT. §
12.110 (1981) (accrues when plaintiff associates his symptoms with a serious condition
and perceives defendant's role in'inducing them)); Staiano v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
304 Pa. Super. 280, 288, 450 A.2d 681, 685 (1982) (42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5524(2) (Purdon 1981 & Supp. 1984-1985) (accrues when plaintiff has knowledge
of injury and knowledge of who or what caused it)); Huggins v. Fulton, 505 F.
Supp. 7, 8 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1980) (accrues when
injury was or should have been discovered)); Strickland v. Johns-Manville Int'l
Corp., 461 F. Supp. 215, 218 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
5526(6) (Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1984) (accrues when plaintiff learned or should have
learned he had disease)); Haslund v. City of Seattle, 86 Wash.2d 607, 620, 547
P.2d 1221, 1229 (1976) (en banc) (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.080(2) (1962)
(accrues when there has been appreciable injury)); Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc.,
113 Wis. 2d 550, 560, 335 N.W.2d 578, 583 (1983) (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.54
(West 1983) (accrues when plaintiff discovers or should have discovered injury));
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that such a change should be the prerogative of the legislature.16
Three types of time-of-discovery rules have generally been acknowl-
edged by the courts: (1) cause of action accrues when plaintiff discovers
the injury; 7 (2) cause of action accrues when plaintiff discovers the
injury and its cause; 8 (3) cause of action accrues when plaintiff
discovers the injury, the cause of the injury and that the injury was
wrongfully inflicted by another.49 Judicial adoption of a time-of-
discovery rule in New York State is likely to take one of these forms.5 0
At the present time, only sixteen states, including New York,5
have neither legislatively nor judicially formulated time-of-discovery
accrual rules which apply to all latent injury actions. 2
II!. Current Federal Statutes of Limitations
The United States Supreme Court, in Urie v. Thompson,53 initiated
Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 343-44 (Wyo. 1979) (WYo. STAT. § 1-3-105(a)
(1977) (accrues from time plaintiff has reason to know of the existence of some
but not all damages)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979).
In Raymond v. Lilly, for example, the supreme court stated that in the absence
of a statutory designation the definition of the word "accrued" should be decided
by the judiciary. 117 N.H. 164, 167, 371 A.2d 170, 172 (1977). The Raymond
court held that a time-of-discovery rule in which plaintiff must discover injury and
causation before the statute of limitations begins to run must apply. Id. at 171,
371 A.2d at 174; see also Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,
580 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Ky. 1979) (overturning 1954 precedent to adopt time-of-
discovery rule) (infra notes 299-306); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 450, 173
A.2d 277, 286 (1961) (overturning 30 years of precedent to adopt time-of-discovery
rule in medical malpractice cases).
46. See infra notes 155-226 and accompanying text.
47. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1102 (5th Cir.
1973) (action against manufacturer of asbestos insulation accrued only after doctor
had performed surgery and diagnosed plaintiff's condition as asbestosis), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974).
48. Grigsby v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 242, 243-44 (D.D.C. 1975)
(plaintiff's action in 1974 for hearing loss sustained in 1968 caused by defendant
drug manufacturer, barred by plaintiff's knowledge in 1968 that hearing loss was
most likely caused by chloroquine toxicity), aff'd mem., 543 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977).
49. Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1975)
(plaintiff's action for damage from asbestosis accrued only when harm was shown
to have been caused by an act for which defendant would be liable); see also
Latent Injury Litigation, supra note 31, at 477-79.
50. See infra notes 261-89 for a proposed time-of-discovery rule for New York
State.
51. See infra notes 155-226 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. For further analysis of statutes
of limitations of the fifty states, see Bartlett, The Legal Development of a Viable
Remedy for Toxic Pollution Victims, BARRISTER Fall 1983, at 41, 44 n.7; Note,
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development of the time-of-discovery rule. The Urie Court interpreted
the Federal Employees' Liability Act (FELA)5 4 holding that the FELA
implicitly included a time-of-discovery rule of accrual." In Urie, the
plaintiff, an employee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad, had worked
as a fireman on steam locomotives for thirty years.56 In 1940, Urie
was diagnosed as suffering from silicosis, a disease caused by in-
halation of the silica dust which was blown into the cabs of the
locomotives upon which he worked.17 The trustee of the railroad
argued that the plaintiff's cause of action must have accrued more
than three years before the institution of the action since Urie had
been inhaling dust since he had begun working in 1910.58 Thus, the
plaintiff's claim could be dismissed justifiably. The trustee also
argued, in the alternative, that damages should be limited to the
three-year period immediately prior to the commencement of the
suit since each inhalation gave rise to a new cause of action.5 9 The
Court rejected both of the trustee's contentions.
Relying on an analysis of congressional intent 6° and on fairness
arguments and without "judicial legislation" qualms, 6' the Court,
in an opinion authored by Justice Rutledge, stated:
If Urie were held barred from prosecuting this action . . . it
would be clear that the federal legislation afforded Urie only a
Denial of a Remedy: Former Residents of Hazardous Waste Sites and New York's
Statute of Limitations, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 161, 170-71 n.55 (1982).
53. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
54. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982).
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between
any of the several States .. .shall be liable in damages to any person
suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce,
. . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier
Id.
55. See 337 U.S. at 169. The FELA, which does not have an express time-of-
discovery rule of accrual, states that "[n]o action shall be maintained ... unless
commenced within three years from the day the cause of action accrued." 45
U.S.C. § 56 (1982).
56. 337 U.S. at 165.
57. Id. at 165-66.
58. Id. at 169.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The Court stated that it assumed Congress had intended occupational
diseases to be included in the list of injuries compensable under FELA. The
application of the strict accrual doctrine would serve to exclude this category of
injuries and, in effect, would "thwart the congressional purpose." Id.
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delusive remedy. It would mean that at some past moment in
time, unknown and inherently unknowable even in retrospect, Urie
was charged with knowledge of the slow and tragic disintegration
of his lungs; under this view Urie's failure to diagnose within the
applicable statute of limitations a disease whose symptoms had
not yet obtruded on his consciousness would constitute waiver of
his right to compensation at the ultimate day of discovery ....
We do not think the humane legislative plan intended such con-
sequences to attach to blameless ignorance. 62
Thus, the Court, in holding that a plaintiff's knowledge of his injury
is essential to the accrual of a cause of action in latent disease
litigation, adopted a time-of-discovery statute of limitations approach
to FELA actions.
63
Similar decisions have been rendered under other federal statutes.
For example, under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),64 the
general rule is that the claim accrues at the time-of-injury. 6 However,
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Kubrick,66 held that accrual
in a medical malpractice action begins when the plaintiff knows of
the existence as well as the cause of his injury. 67 Lower federal
62. Id. at 169-70.
63. Id.; see also Emmons v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 701 F.2d 1112, 1122
(5th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff knew his ankle injury was work-related more than three
years before he filed claim and was, therefore, barred from stating such claim even
though physician had not formally told him his injury was work-related); Fletcher
v. Union Pac. R.R., 621 F.2d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 1980) (cause of action for industrial
disease accrues when employee becomes aware of his condition, but plaintiff's back
injury from shoveling crushed rock was merely a worsened condition, not a latent
injury), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1110 (1981).
64. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671-80 (1978). The Federal Tort Claims
Act is a statute under which personal injury claims may be brought against the
United States. Section 1346(b) provides, in part, that "the district courts . . . shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for
money damages . . . for personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
Section 2401(b) provides, in part, that "[a] tort claim against the United States
shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal
agency within two years after such claim accrues . . . ... 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
65. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
66. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
67. Id. at 117-25. In Kubrick, the plaintiff was administered neomycin by an
employee of a Veterans' Administration Hospital in 1968 which led to his loss of
hearing. Since the plaintiff was denied benefits in 1969 for the loss, he sued under
the FTCA in 1972. Id. at 113-15; accord Waits v. United States, 611 F.2d 550
(5th Cir. 1980) (claimant must be aware of act or omission which caused injury
in medical malpractice action); Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.
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courts promptly applied the Kubrick definitions of accrual to latent
injury claims in addition to medical malpractice claims. 68
In Stoleson v. United States,69 the plaintiff had been processing
munitions and rocket propellants containing nitroglycerin for ap-
proximately one year when she began experiencing angina of the
chest and suffered a myocardial infarction. The plaintiff returned
to the same work area for three more years during which time she
suffered weekend angina attacks at progressively shorter intervals. 70
From the time of her heart attack, the plaintiff suspected a causal
link between her work and her health. 7' At one point, she was
denied a requested transfer. At the time of denial, the in-house
doctor felt that the nitroglycerin would actually do her good. Ad-
ditionally, the plaintiff read in the union newspaper that sudden
withdrawal from nitroglycerin could cause angina of the chest. Two
years later, a doctor finally linked her health problem with the
exposure to nitroglycerin 7 and more than one year after the con-
nection had been scientifically documented,73 the plaintiff brought
suit against the United States under the FTCA. 74
The court of appeals reversed the district court's holding75 that the
plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations.7 6 Although
she had suspected the causal connection between her attacks and
her exposure to nitroglycerin more than two years before she had
filed her claim, the claim had been rendered incapable of proof
since medical science had not recognized the causal connection. 77
1962) (malpractice action accrues when claimant discovers, or in exercise of rea-
sonable diligence, should have discovered existence of acts of malpractice upon
which claim is based). The Kubrick Court, however, refused to liberalize the rule
to include claimant's knowledge of a right to bring a medical malpractice action
as a prerequisite to commence the statute running. 444 U.S. at 123; see Note,
Kubrick v. United States: Accrual of a Medical Malpractice Claim Under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 123 (1981) for a discussion of Kubrick.
68. Sheehan v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 18, 21 (S.D. Miss. 1982) (veteran's
action brought in 1981 for damages caused by exposure to radiation in 1952 and
1953 while in Army was barred by statute of limitations since his injuries had
manifested themselves more than two years before he had filed his claim), aff'd,
713 F.2d 1097, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2354 (1984); see also infra note 78.
69. 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980).
70. Id. at 1266.
71. Id. at 1267.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1271.
76. Id. at 1267.
77. Id. at 1270-71.
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Only when the causal connection had been scientifically documented
did the statute of limitations begin to run. The court recognized
that the defendants might be burdened by what appeared to be stale
claims but decided nonetheless that dismissal would be unjust when
the defendants already had breached their preexisting duties to plain-
tiffs.,,
On an administrative level, the United States Department of Com-
merce adhered to the time-of-discovery rule of accrual in adopting
the Uniform Product Liability Act (UPLA).7 9 In the statute of
limitations portion of the UPLA, the drafters noted that the two
year period from when plaintiff discovers or should have discovered
his injury "extends the limitation period beyond the time of harm
in situations where the claimant would have no reason to know
about the harm or the causal connection to a defective product....
This reflects a general trend in both statutory and case law." 80 The
UPLA also contains a ten-year statute of repose which does not
apply to latent injuries.8 ' Thus far, the UPLA has not been fully
78. Id. at 1271. For other examples of the time-of-discovery rule as applied
under the FTCA, see Steele v. United States, 599 F.2d 823, 828 (7th Cir. 1979)
(claimant must know last essential element of tort, i.e., the damage); Sweet v.
United States, 528 F. Supp. 1068, 1071-72 (D.S.D. 1981) (serviceman's claim barred
two years after obtaining knowledge that drug administered as experiment in 1957
had been L.S.D.), aff'd, 687 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1982); Schnurman v. United States,
490 F. Supp. 429, 435 (E.D. Va. 1980) (claimant barred two years after his physician
suggested causal link between his infirmities and 1944 mustard gas experiment).
One pre-Kubrick case applied a time-of-discovery rule to a latent injury claim.
Kuhne v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 523, 526 (E.D. Tenn. 1965) (claim not barred
where radiation exposure during World War II which caused bone cancer not
diagnosed until 1965). See Note, Stoleson v. United States: FTCA-Expanding the
Discovery Rule in Occupational Disease Cases, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 873 (1981) for
a discussion of Stoleson.
79. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,732 (1979). Section 110(C) states that "[n]o claim
under this Act may be brought more than two (2) years from the time the claimant
discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, the harm
and the cause thereof." Id. at 62,732. The UPLA was originally drafted in 1978
by the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability chaired by the De-
partment of Commerce. 43 Fed. Reg. 14,612 (1978).
80. 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,734.
81. Section 1l0(B)(2)(d) reads:
The ten- (10-) year period of repose .. . shall not apply if the harm
was caused by prolonged exposure to a defective product, or if the injury-
causing aspect of the product that existed at the time of delivery was
not discoverable by an ordinary reasonably prudent person until more
than ten (10) years after the time of delivery, or if the harm, caused
within ten (10) years after the time of delivery, did not manifest itself
until after that time.
Id. at 62,732; see supra note 40 for a discussion of statutes of repose.
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adopted by any state.8
2
One year after the UPLA was adopted, the House of Represen-
tatives began working on a Product Liability Act (Act) which would
preempt all existing state product liability statutes. 83 The proposed
Senate version of the Act, which is presently under consideration,
includes a time-of-discovery provision.8 It also contains a twenty-
five year statute of repose which is inapplicable if the harm does
not manifest itself until after the expiration of the twenty-five years.85
The Act was recently approved by the Senate Commerce Committee
8 6
with the time-of-discovery provision intact, but it has yet to be voted
upon by the full Senate. 7 Thus, time-of-discovery statute of limi-
tations provisions have been adopted by administrative agencies, the
82. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1984) [hereinafter cited as S. 44
REPORT].
83. Id. at 10. The Act does not broaden federal court jurisdiction, and will
not expand the caseload of the federal courts. Id. at 23. The Senate Report on
the Act states:
Almost every product manufactured and sold today is a product in
interstate commerce. The current climate of uncertainty in product liability
law adversely affects and burdens interstate commerce. Under the Com-
merce Clause of the [United States] Constitution, Congress has the power
to enact a uniform Federal product liability act. The Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution also gives Congress the power to enact
a Federal Law that replaces State law in the area of product liability.
The fact that tort law is traditionally a matter of State law does not
alter this rule. Congress has enacted a number of statutes that preempt
State tort law. . . . Where the act does not establish a rule of law,
State law will apply. As a result of the uniform standards, the act will
resolve many of the problems and ambiguities currently associated with
product liability law.
Id. at 24 (footnotes omitted).
84. S. 44 REPORT, supra note 82, at 63-64. The statute of limitations provision
provides:
12(a)(1) If a product is a capital good, no claim alleging unsafe design
or formulation . . . may be brought for harm caused by such a product
more than 25 years from the date of delivery of the product to its first
purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling or
leasing the product or using the product as a component in the man-
ufacture of another product . . . (b) Subsection (a) is not applicable if
(2) the harm of the claimant was caused by the cumulative effect
of prolonged exposure to a defective product; or (3) the harm caused
within the period referred to in subsection (a), did not manifest itself
until the expiration of that period.
S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(a), (b) (1983).
85. S. 44 REPORT, supra note 82, at 13.
86. Id. at 68. The vote was 11-5 with one abstention.
87. While insiders predicted 60% chance of passage, consumer groups led by
Ralph Nader opposed the Act claiming that it would shrink plaintiffs' awards.
Wall St. J., May 17, 1984, at 1, col. 5. Other consumer groups supported the bill
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courts and the legislature at the federal level. 8
IV. New York State Statutes of Limitations
Despite state89 and federal trends90 towards a time-of-discovery
rule, New York continues to adhere to a strict accrual rule in latent
injury cases. 9' The New York State Court of Appeals and the New York
State Legislature must reevaluate this rule in light of these trends. 92
Time is literally running out for many toxic tort victims.
primarily because of its liberal statute of limitations provision. Id. By the time the
second session of the 98th Congress had ajourned on October 12, 1984, the Act had not
been passed. Tolchin, Congress in Its 98th Session Slowed President's Program,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1984, at Al, col. 5. It should be noted that 34 states already
have some form of time-of-discovery rule applicable to all latent disease cases. See
supra note 41 and accompanying text. Allowing the plaintiff lobby a time-of-
discovery rule is therefore much less meaningful than would first appear. See S.
44 REPORT, supra note 82, at 102-03 (Hollings, minority view).
88. See supra notes 53-88 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 33-52 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 53-88 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs who were exposed
to asbestos in ship yards have also successfully invoked independent federal juris-
diction to apply the more liberal time-of-discovery statute of limitations rule and
laches theory of admiralty law. See, e.g., White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d
234, 240 (4th Cir. 1981) (shipyard workers installed asbestos insulation materials
in drydock and aboard ships on navigable waters, therefore admiralty jurisdiction
and laches theory applies), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). But see Austin v.
Unarco Indus., Inc., 705 F.2d 1, 6-14 (1st Cir. 1983) (asbestos installation not
traditional concern of admiralty and therefore laches theory does not apply), cert.
dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 34 (1983); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court,
698 F.2d 967, 969 (9th Cir. 1983) (tort lacked maritime flavor necessary to invoke
maritime jurisdiction); Volpe v. Johns-Manville Corp., -Pa. Super.- 470 A.2d 164,
169 (1983) (plaintiff not performing traditional seaman's role). See also supra note
45 for federal courts sitting in diversity which have applied state time-of-discovery
common law.
91. See infra notes 155-226 and accompanying text.
92. This is not to suggest that the adoption of a time-of-discovery rule in New
York State, while arguably essential to the equitable disposition of plaintiffs' claims
in toxic substance cases, would be a panacea. Judge Cavanaugh of the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, in commenting upon the burden placed on the court system by
asbestos litigation, quoted from an opinion written by Judge Klein of the Penn-
sylvania Court of Common Pleas, a trial judge who was experiencing this burden
first hand:
The civil court calendar in Philadelphia cannot cope with this volume
of over 3,000 asbestos cases that have been filed. . . . Sick people and
people who have died a terrible death from asbestos are being turned
away from the courts, while people with minimal injuries . . . are being
awarded hundreds of thousands of dollars. . . . The asbestos litigation
often resembles the casinos sixty miles east of Philadelphia more than
a courtroom procedure. And just as the casinos are the winners in Atlantic
City, the lawyers are the winners in asbestos litigation since the costs
of litigation far exceed benefits paid to claimants.
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While both the New York State Legislature and New York Court
of Appeals have failed to adopt the time-of-discover rule in latent
Doe v. Johns-Manville Corp., -Pa. Super.-, 471 A.2d 1252, 1256 (1984) (quoting
Blue v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 4001, slip op. at 14-15 (C.P. Phila. Oct. 12, 1983)).
In Doe, the plaintiff discovered calcified tissue on his lungs which was directly
linked to his employment as an asbestos worker. Plaintiff, however, suffered no
immediate disability from his condition, but suspected that severe disability would
ultimately result as the disease matured into asbestosis. Plaintiff therefore sought
relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that the Pennsylvania statute of
limitations does not accrue until the injured person actually becomes disabled.
Judge Cavanaugh's majority opinion denied declaratory relief to the plaintiff, stating
that such relief is designed to determine fixed legal rights rather than to "enhance
his legal rights which are fixed by decisional law." Id. at 1255.
Another issue which affects judicial economy is whether the statute of limitations
commences running on a second disease which manifests itself after the original
disease has been discovered. Allowing separate accrual on the second injury could
conceivably exacerbate the court calendar problem. Nonetheless, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held in Wilson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982), that discovery of a disease
did not commence the statute of limitations on all claims of separate, distinct and
later-manifested disease that might be caused by the same exposure. 684 F.2d at
120-21. In Wilson, plaintiff, an insulation installer who was regularly exposed to
asbestos, was told he had asbestosis in 1973 but in 1978 was diagnosed as having
mesothelioma, a cancer of the lining of the lung, from which he died that year.
Id. at 112-13. In 1979, the plaintiff's widow brought a wrongful death and survival
action against Johns-Manville but the district court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment that the 1979 claim was time-barred. Id. at 115. The court
of appeals reversed the district court concluding that judicial economy and the
interest of the plaintiff's relief outweighed the defendant's interest in repose. Id.
at 120-21. Implicit in this decision was the notion that if the statute of limitations
commences at the intital diagnosis, the plaintiffs who ordinarily would be com-
pensated adequately by workers' compensation insurance would sue in anticipation
of a second disease. These suits would be unnecessary and judicial economy would
not be served. Id.; see Latent Injury Litigation, supra note 31, at 483-93 for a
discussion of Wilson.
On balance, it appears that barring plaintiffs' suits completely and placing the
entire cost of their disease on them is far less equitable than requiring courts,
legislatures and defendants to apply creative solutions to the problem. For example,
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CER-
CLA or Superfund) would spread costs throughout a society which has reaped
benefits from the production of various toxic substances. See DiNal & Kovall, The
Superfund Blues: CERCLA Reauthorization and a New Proposal for Funding, 13
THE BRIEF 29 (1984) (trust fund for Environmental Protection Agency to clean up
abandoned toxic waste sites funded by excise tax levied on petrochemical industry
and producers of certain inorganic materials); see also Maker of Intrauterine Device
Starting Drive to Halt Its Use, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1984, at A15, col. 4 (A.H.
Robins Company has begun recall of 2.5 million Dalkon Shield intrauterine birth
control devices sold in United States); Flaherty, Second Wave of Litigation Hits
Asbestos, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 29, 1984, at 23, col. 1 (federal judge in Philadelphia
certified nationwide class action for up to 14,000 school districts with property
damage claims for asbestos clean-up); Sullivan, More Control On Asbestos is Sought,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1984, § 11, at 1, col. 3 (concern over asbestos in public
schools has prompted New Jersey to develop its own asbestos clean-up program);
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XIII
injury cases,93 both have recognized exceptions to the strict accrual
rule94 in other types of product liability cases.95 In Martin v. Edwards
Laboratories96 and a companion case, Lindsey v. A.H. Robins Co., 97
the New York State Court of Appeals applied a time-of-injury statute
of limitations accrual period to medical implant cases. 98 The Victorson
v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.99 decision applied the same time-
of-injury" exception'00 to cases involving injuries from defective
products outside the body. 1°1 Additionally, the New York State
Legislature has created a narrow time-of-discovery exception to the
general statute of limitations accrual period for cases involving Agent
Orange assimilation in Vietnam veterans. 10 2 Moreover, the legislature
has codified an exception to the three-year statute of limitations
accrual period originally recognized by the court in medical mal-
practice actions. 03 Thus, there is precedent in both the judicial and
legislative arenas for altering the rule of strict accrual in toxic tort
cases.
Shabecoff, E.P.A. Seeks No Money for School Asbestos Plan, N.Y. Times, Sept.
27, 1984, at AIS, col. 1 (Congress authorized program to help school systems
remove asbestos but the E.P.A. will not ask Congress to appropriate funds for
1985 or 1986); cf. Lewin, Judge Aids Claims on Asbsetos, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8,
1984, at D10, col. 4 (claims against asbestos producer not allowed to be heard in
bankruptcy court where damages awards are generally thought to be lower). Cir-
cumventing the toxic substance injury problem by barring plaintiffs' suits will not
obviate a problem which affects more people as the number of identified cancer
causing agents increases. See supra note 2.
The issue thus becomes not whether a plaintiff can file a claim at all but rather
how many and what types of claims may be entertained by the court. This issue
must be considered by courts and state legislatures in determining the scope of a
time-of-discovery rule. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text for a discussion
of various types of time-of-discovery rules.
93. See infra notes 155-226, 261-90 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 104-54, 227-260 and accompanying text for these exceptions.
95. The statute of limitations is codified in N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 214: "The
following actions must be commenced within three years: . . . 5 an action to
recover damages for a personal injury except as provided in sections 214-b and
215." N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 214 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
96. 60 N.Y.2d 417, 457 N.E.2d 1150, 469 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1983).
97. Id.; see infra notes 123-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Martin
and Lindsey.
98. 60 N.Y.2d at 428, 457 N.E.2d at 1155-56, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29.
99. 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975); see infra notes
104-12 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
101. Id.
102. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 214-b (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); see infra notes
227-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of this exception.
103. For medical malpractice cases, New York courts have developed a "con-
tinuing treatment" theory, whereby accrual of a plaintiff's cause of action is tolled
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A. Time of Injury Accrual: The Rule in Victorson and Martin
The New York State time-of-injury exception to the three-year
statute of limitations for personal injury cases originated in the court
of appeals decision in Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,1"4
which involved products that remained entirely outside the body. 05
The court held that the accrual period begins to run at the date of
injury in a strict products liability action, rather than at the date
of the sale of the product alleged to have caused the injury.'06 In
so holding, the court overruled prior erroneous decisional law. 10 7
Significantly, the present court of appeals refuses to apply the same
reasoning used in Victorson to change the strict accrual rule in toxic
substance cases.10 8
In Victorson, the plaintiffs in three companion cases had been
injured by centrifuge laundry extractors manufactured and sold by
the defendant more than four years prior to the plaintiffs' respective
injuries. 19 The Victorson court recognized that a strict products
liability action "sounds in tort rather than in contract.""' 0 The court
until completion of the treatment for the malady which gave rise to the malpractice
claim. See, e.g., McDermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 452
N.Y.S.2d 351 (1982) (plaintiff consulted dermatologist from 1974 to 1976 for removal
of moles but plaintiff discovered malignant melanoma in 1978 where mole was
removed; cause of action accrued in 1974 but tolled until 1976); see also D. SIEGEL,
NEW YORK PRACTICE §§ 40-43 (1978 & Supp. 1981-1982). The legislature has
codified the continuing treatment and the foreign object time-of-discovery rule for
medical malpractice claims in CPLR § 214-a. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 214-a
(McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). See infra notes 246-60 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the rule of accrual in medical malpractice actions in New York State;
see also Lehr, The Past, Present and . . . ? of the Statute of Limitations in
Medical Malpractice (New York), 14 TRIAL LAW. Q. 20 (1982).
104. 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
105. For purposes of this Note, products which remain outside the body are
defined as products which remain unassimilated either by ingestion, inhalation or
absorption and include such products as household appliances, industrial machinery
and automobiles. See also infra note 109 and accompanying text.
106. 37 N.Y.2d at 399, 335 N.E.2d at 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 40; see infra notes
109-12 and accompanying text.
107. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 205-21 and accompanying text.
109. 37 N.Y.2d at 400, 335 N.E.2d at 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 41. Plaintiff in
Victorson v. Bock, 44 A.D.2d 702, 355 N.Y.S.2d 565 (2d Dep't 1974), had been
injured in 1964 by extractor sold in 1948; plaintiff in Rivera v. Berkeley, 44 A.D.2d
316, 354 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dep't 1974), had been injured in 1967 by extractor
sold in 1959; plaintiff in Brown v. 1580 St. John's Place, 44 A.D.2d 705, 354
N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d Dep't 1974), had been injured in 1965 by extractor sold in 1955.
37 N.Y.2d at 400, 335 N.E.2d at 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
110. Id. at 402, 335 N.E.2d at 278, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 43; see J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 424-25 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as CALAMARI
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stated that the accrual-at-injury statute of limitations period it had
adopted in other tort actions must therefore operate instead of the
"from the date-of-sale" or "tender-on-delivery" accrual period ap-
plied in contract actions under CPLR section 213(2)"' or the Uniform
Commercial Code, section 2-725(2).' 12 The latter statute of limitations
approaches are strict accrual approaches since the plaintiff's cause
of action begins to run when the plaintiff purchases the product,
regardless of when the actual injury occurs.
In adopting the time-of-injury rule in Victorson, the court of
appeals overruled its decision in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. "I In Mendel, the court had dismissed a plaintiff's action
for injuries suffered in October, 1965, when the defendant's door
struck the plaintiff thereby causing her to fall."14 The door had been
delivered and installed in October, 1958, and, therefore, plaintiff's
cause of action had expired in 1964."11 In so ruling, the Mendel
court applied the contract "accrual at date-of-sale" rule as narrowly
as the Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co. 1 6 court has recently applied the
strict accrual rule to latent disease cases:"17
We are willing to sacrifice the small percentage of meritorious
claims that might arise after the statutory period has run in order
to prevent the many unfounded suits that would be brought and
sustained against manufacturers ad infinitum. Surely an injury
resulting from a defective product many years after it has been
manufactured . . . is due to operation and maintenance. It is
our opinion that to guard against the unfounded actions that
would be brought many years after a product is manufactured,
we must ... [hold] the contract Statute of Limitations applicable
118
Judge Breitel's dissent in Mendel echoes other strong dissents in
& PERILLO]. See generally Note, Statute of Limitation on Strict Products Liability
Actions in New York, 40 ALB. L. REV. 869 (1976).
111. CPLR § 213 states that "the following actions must be commenced within
six years: . . . 2. an action upon a contractual obligation or liability express or
implied . . . ." N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 213 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1983-1984).
112. 37 N.Y.2d at 403, 335 N.E.2d at 278-79, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 43-44. Section
2-725(1) provides that: "a]n action for breach of any contract for sale must be
commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original
agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one
year but may not extend it." U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1978); see also CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 110, at 185-88.
113. 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
114. Id. at 342, 253 N.E.2d at 208, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
115. Id.
116. 62 N.Y.2d 888, 467 N.E.2d 517, 478 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1984).
117. See infra notes 205-21 and accompanying text.
118. 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
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the toxic substances cases: 19 "[flor most torts, there is no cause of
action until injury occurs. . . . Hence, it is all but unthinkable that
a person should be time-barred from prosecuting a cause of action
before he ever had one." 2 Six years later, the New York State Court
of Appeals heeded Judge Breitel's words and overruled the Mendel
decision in Victorson.'2 ' This progression suggests that if the court
can alter decisional law regarding statute of limitations accrual pe-
riods for one type of product liability case, it can do so for other
types of product liability cases. 122
The court of appeals also accepted a more liberal accrual rule in
Martin v. Edwards Laboratories23 where it applied the Victorson
time-of-injury rule to cases involving malfunctioning medical im-
plants. In Martin, the plaintiff's decedent died on May 15, 1979
after Teflon particles from an artificial aortic valve which had been
implanted on June 7, 1976, broke away and caused cerebral infarction
and hemorrhaging. 2 4 The suit was commenced on June 1, 1981.125
119. See infra notes 188-93, 199-204, 220-21 and accompanying text.
120. 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 211, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495 (Breitel, J.,
dissenting).
121. 37 N.Y.2d at 403-04, 335 N.E.2d at 279, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
[The limitations period] depends on a nice balancing of policy consid-
erations. "Any Statute of Limitations reflects a policy that there must
come a time after which fairness demands that a defendant should not
be harried; the duration . . . is chosen with a balancing sense of fairness
to the claimant that he shall not unreasonably be deprived of his right
to assert his claim." . . . [W]hile passage of time may work a deterioration
of the manufacturer's capability to defend, by similar token it can be
expected to complicate the plaintiff's problem at proving . . . that the
alleged defect existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's
plant . . . . [T]he authorities are now in general agreement that Statute
of Limitations governing injuries to persons or property are those properly
applicable to strict products liability claims.
Id. (quoting Caffaro v. Trayna, 35 N.Y.2d 245, 250, 319 N.E.2d 174, 176, 360
N.Y.S.2d 847, 850 (1974)).
122. Evidently the Victorson court must have been as concerned as the present
court about a flood of new, possibly spurious, suits stemming from liberalization
of the accrual rule. Indeed, the Mendel court in dealing with the same issue as
the Victorson court noted that it was willing to sacrifice the small percentage of
worthy claims "in order to prevent the many unfounded suits that would be brought
and sustained against manufacturers ad infinitum." 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d
at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495. Surely, court calendar congestion and the loss of
business in New York State was no less a concern then. However, today, most
states have more liberal accrual rules and there would in effect be nowhere for
business to relocate solely to avoid a liberalized New York State accrual rule. See
supra note 41 and accompanying text for those states with more liberal accrual
rules for all latent injury cases.
123. 60 N.Y.2d 417, 457 N.E.2d 1150, 469 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1983).
124. Id. at 422, 457 N.E.2d at 1152, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
125. Martin v. Edwards Laboratories, 112 Misc. 2d 93, 94, 446 N.Y.S.2d 182,
183 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1982). Plaintiff served summons on defendant component
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The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the com-
plaint as time-barred since more than three years had passed since
the valve had been implanted. 12 6 The plaintiff moved for reargument
and offered the pre-trial testimony of a pathologist who stated that
the breakdown of the valve had begun within months of decedent's
death.'2 7 The trial court then reinstated the complaint.2 8 The appellate
division, however, dismissed the personal injury cause of action in
the complaint, adhering to the strict accrual rule that the plaintiff's
cause of action began when the valve was initially implanted.'29
The court of appeals decided the companion case of Lindsey v.
A.H. Robins Co. 30 at the same time it considered Martin. In
Lindsey, the defendant, Dr. Joel Ullman, inserted a Dalkon Shield man-
ufactured by defendant A.H. Robins Company, Inc. into the plain-
tiff's uterus on March 29, 1971.'1' In March, 1973, the plaintiff
developed a pelvic infection allegedly caused by the Dalkon Shield.
This infection eventually caused her sterility. 32 In October, 1975,
Lindsey began an action in federal court but voluntarily discontinued
it since there was no diversity of citizenship to sustain the action.' 33
manufacturer Dow on May 7, 1981, on defendant component manufacturer DuPont
on May I1, 1981, on defendant component manufacturer Cabot on May 11, 1981,
and on defendant manufacturer Edwards Laboratories on May 27, 1981. Id.
126. Id. at 94, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
127. 60 N.Y.2d at 423, 457 N.E.2d at 1152, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 925-26. The
pathologist, who had performed the autopsy on decedent, based his conclusion on
the fact that Teflon material found in decedent's brain was identical to Teflon
material used in the heart valve. He then estimated that the accumulation of Teflon
material in decedent's brain had begun only a few months before decedent's death.
Id. It should be noted that plaintiff's personal injury cause of action would have
been barred even under the time-of-injury statute of limitations had accumulation
and, thus, injury, begun more than one year before decedent's death in this particular
case. Accrual would have begun on May 15, 1978, manifestation would have occurred
on May 15, 1979 and the statute of limitations would have run on May 15, 1981.
Suit was filed on June 1, 1981 more than two weeks after the statute of limitations
period had run. At best, a plaintiff's suit in this instance revolves around the
speculative testimony of a medical expert.
128. 112 Misc. 2d at 99, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
129. 91 A.D.2d 1172, 1173, 459 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (4th Dep't 1983).
130. 60 N.Y.2d 417, 457 N.E.2d 1150, 469 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1983).
131. 60 N.Y.2d at 423, 457 N.E.2d at 1153, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 926. The Dalkon
Shield is an intrauterine contraception device consisting of a plastic circle with
spokes along the circumference to which a string is attached. The string extends
from the uterus to let the user know that the device is in place. Lindsey v. A.H.
Robins, 91 A.D.2d 150, 151, 458 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (2d Dep't 1983).
132. 60 N.Y.2d at 423, 457 N.E.2d at 1153, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 926. Plaintiff
alleged that she had sustained permanent damage to her ovaries and fallopian tubes.
The string attached to the shield had allegedly acted as an " 'open highway' inviting
invasion by bacteria." 91 A.D.2d at 154, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
133. 91 A.D.2d at 151-52, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
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She subsequently began an action against Ullman and Robins in
state court on February 5, 1976, which was within three years
of the diagnosis of her pelvic disease.'34 The defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint in April, 1981 on the grounds that it was
barred by the three year statute of limitations.' In opposition to
the motion, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit from a physician
who opined that the design of the shield had allowed bacteria to
enter the uterus and injure her only a few days or weeks before
the pelvic infection was diagnosed.' 3 6 The court granted the de-
fendants' motions to dismiss as to Robins, but, as to Ullman,
the dismissal was restricted to his actions which were taken more
than three years before service of the federal complaint. 37 The
appellate division reversed the lower court ruling on the motion to
dismiss on the basis of evidence which suggested that injury had
occurred in the proximity of the March, 1973 diagnosis rather than
upon insertion.'
3 8
The court of appeals ultimately adopted the Victorson39 time-of-
injury statute of limitations rule for both the Martin'40 and Lindsey'4'
cases since the time of injury with respect to products implanted
or inserted in the human body "will most often be the date when
the product malfunctions."' 42 Both plaintiffs had set forth sufficient
134. Id. at 152, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
135. Id.; see supra note 95 for the text of the New York State' personal injury
statute of limitations.
136. 91 A.D.2d at 152, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 603. Again, the plaintiff's suit revolved
around testimony of a medical expert who could have found infection to have
begun upon insertion. Had this been the expert's conclusion, the time-of-injury
accrual rule would have barred plaintiff's action. See also supra note 127 and
accompanying text. However, plaintiff's expert found that this particular type of
infection, sub-acute salpingitis, had a two- to three-week incubation period which
allowed plaintiff to discover her disease within the three-year statute of limitations.
91 A.D.2d at 152, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
137. Id. at 152, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
138. Id. at 159-60, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 607. The court also stated that:
The cause of action comes into being only when the product causes
damage or injury .... [The injury] here would be at the point at which
the shield's tail conducted infectious bacteria up into the uterus.
... The cause of action accrued when that injury occurred, not at some
earlier date when the shield had been inserted.
Id.; see also Reyes v. Bertocchi, 92 A.D.2d 863, 864, 459 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (2d
Dep't 1983) (plaintiff's injury occurred in 1978 when she experienced abdominal
pain, rather than in 1973 when "Majzlin Spring" intrauterine device was inserted).
139. 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39; see supra notes 104-22
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Victorson time-of-injury rule.
140. 60 N.Y.2d 417, 428, 457 N.E.2d 1150, 1155-56, 469 N.Y.S.2d 923, 928-29.
141. Id.
142. 60 N.Y.2d at 428, 457 N.E.2d at 1155-56, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29.
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evidence showing that the date of injury had occurred less than
three years before the action was instituted. 143 In Martin, the artificial
heart valve had begun to disintegrate a few months before the
plaintiff's death, and in Lindsey, the bacteria first entered the plain-
tiff's uterus a few weeks before the pelvic examination revealed the
infection. 144 Thus, the court of appeals reversed the appellate di-
vision's dismissal of the plaintiff's personal injury cause of action
in Martin and affirmed the appellate division's denial of the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss in Lindsey. 4 In essence, the court
extended the time-of-injury rule to include implants in order to avoid
what might otherwise have been an unjust decision had a strict
accrual rule been applied. Arguably, further judicial adjustment of
the accrual rule in New York State to avoid unjust decisions in
latent injury cases would be quite consistent with the Martin and
Victorson decisions.146
The Martin decision, however, creates the potential for future
injustice in medical implantation and insertion cases by assuming
that breakdown, injury and discovery will occur simultaneously to
give the plaintiff the notice necessary to commence an action within
three years.' 47 Further, the court of appeals deliberately restricted
the issue in Martin and Lindsey to the proper accrual period of a
cause of action in insert or implant product liability cases rather
than expanding it to accrual periods in all types of products liability
cases. 148 The plaintiff in Martin, for example, urged the court to
adopt the rationale of cases involving products not implanted or
taken into the body in which a cause of action occurs when the
product breaks down and causes injury. 149 Defendant, on the other
hand, urged adoption of the rule in cases involving substances
ingested or inhaled, where the plaintiff's cause of action accrues
upon the first inhalation or ingestion.150 The court's decision reflected
143. Id. at 428-29, 457 N.E.2d at 1156, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
144. See supra notes 127 and 136 and accompanying text.
145. 60 N.Y.2d at 429, 457 N.E.2d at 1156-57, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
146. See infra notes 227-45 and accompanying text for discussion of legislative
adjustment of the accrual rule in New York State to avoid unjust results in Agent
Orange cases.
147. 60 N.Y.2d at 428, 457 N.E.2d at 1155-56, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29.
148. 60 N.Y.2d at 424, 457 N.E.2d at 1153, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 926. "The two
cases thus present a common question: on what date does the three-year period
of limitations applicable to product liability actions . . . begin to run with respect
to a product inserted or implanted in but not assimilated by the body and intended
to have a continuing function?" Id.
149. Id. at 424, 457 N.E.2d at 1153, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 927; see supra notes 104-
22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Victorson time-of-injury rule.
150. Id. at 424, 457 N.E.2d at 1153, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 926; see infra notes 163-
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its unwillingness to adopt a more liberal accrual rule' for all products
liability cases, as well as its adherence to distinctions among the
various types of product liability cases.' 52
The inadequacy of the time-of-injury accrual rule in medical im-
plant and insertion cases is illustrated in the following hypothetical.
It is conceivable that a person with an artificial heart valve could
suffer a stroke four years after the valve had begun to malfunction.
Quite possibly, the causal factors which culminated in the stroke
were set into motion when the valve first malfunctioned. Such forces,
however, may have produced an injury which would not manifest
itself until four years later. If, upon expert medical testimony, it is
determined that the injury-in-fact occurred when the valve mal-
functioned four years before the stroke, then the plaintiff would be
barred from stating a cause of action.'53 Only if expert medical
testimony showed that injury had occurred less than three years
before the stroke would the plaintiff's claim be allowed. Thus, the
time-of-injury rule could still result in unjust decisions in implant
and insertion cases where a plaintiff who has no knowledge of the
injury when it occurs is deprived of a cause of action merely because
of the three year statute of limitations.'54
B. Toxic Assimilation: Strict Accrual Statute of Limitations Rule
in New York
The New York Court of Appeals originally adopted a strict
accrual statute of limitations instead of a time-of-discovery statute
of limitations in toxic substance cases to avoid, among other things,
226 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application of the strict accrual
rule in New York State; see also Birnbaum, New York Practice: Statute of Lim-
itations in Products Liability, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 29, 1984, at 1, col. I [hereinafter
cited as New York Practice].
151. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of jurisdictions
which have adopted more liberal rules in latent injury cases.
152. 60 N.Y.2d at 425-27, 457 N.E.2d at 1154-55, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 927-28.
153. The problem of proving when the breakdown and injury occur may be
formidable. See, e.g., Weinreich v. A.H. Robins Co., 96 A.D.2d 860, 465 N.Y.S.2d
765 (2d Dep't 1983) (plaintiff failed to tender evidentiary proof as to date of injury
and court assumed injury had occurred at time of insert).
154. One commentator used another hypothetical to illustrate the problem:
Assume . . . that plaintiff was continually exposed to a harmful substance
from 1970 to 1982 and commenced an action in 1984. . . . Will plaintiff's
claim be limited to recovery of damages caused by the exposure in 1981
and 1982? What if competent medical evidence indicates that the effect
of the exposures was cumulative and that no methodology exists for
pinpointing which exposure(s) caused an identifiable amount of injury?
Does the court's formulation of the strict accrual rule require plaintiff
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undue reliance upon expert medical testimony.'55 The Martin'56 de-
cision runs contrary to the original intention of the court in this
respect since medical testimony will still be required to determine
the time-of-injury. The court of appeals should resolve the present
ambiguities in the law which it has itself created in order to adjudicate
toxic tort claims more equitably.'5 7
In the case of a toxic substance which has been inhaled, ingested
or injected, the court in Martin "reaffirmed the rule that the time
to sue for injuries . . . runs from the last exposure to the substance,
not from the discovery of the injury."' 58 The court, thereby, explicitly
affirmed prior court of appeals toxic substance decisions in which
the court deferred to the legislature.'59 The Martin court, however,
refused to apply the same strict accrual statute of limitations to
medical implant and insertion cases stating that implants and in-
sertions cause injury only when they malfunction and not upon first
exposure. 60 The court of appeals stated that implant and insertion
cases are different from toxic tort cases because the product's con-
tinued existence eliminates the likelihood of fraud. 6' This view,
however, ignores the fact that even in toxic tort cases the chances
for fraud are slim and the harm done to plaintiff is great. 61
The seminal toxic substance assimilation case is Schmidt v. Mer-
chants Despatch Transp. Co. 63 In Schmidt, the court of appeals, in
an opinion written by Judge Lehman, applied the statute of limi-
tations strict accrual rule to three separate actions 64 where the
to bear the burden of establishing a reasonable scheme for the appor-
tioning of an indivisible injury at the risk of being barred from any
recovery? Alternatively, does the strict accrual rule permit the plaintiff
to wait until the exposure to a toxic substance is ended and then sue
within three years to recover for all damages sustained?
New York Practice, supra note 150, at 2, col. 4. Clearly, questions of damages
would create the potential for fraud and speculative expert medical testimony; this
led the court to adopt strict accrual over discovery in the first place. See infra
note 174 and accompanying text.
155. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
156. 60 N.Y.2d 417, 457 N.E.2d 1150, 469 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1983).
157. See infra notes 261-310 and accompanying text for proposed resolution of
the ambiguities presented by the Martin decision.
158. 60 N.Y.2d at 426, 457 N.E.2d at 1154, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
159. See infra notes 163-226 and accompanying text.
160. 60 N.Y.2d at 427, 457 N.E.2d at 1155, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
161. Id.
162. See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
163. 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).
164. Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 244 A.D. 606, 280 N.Y.S.
836 (4th Dep't 1935); Felli v. United States Gypsum Co., 244 A.D. 606, 280 N.Y.S.
836 (4th Dep't 1935); Labieko v. Am. Piano Co., 244 A.D. 606, 280 N.Y.S. 855
(4th Dep't 1935).
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plaintiffs had contracted pneumoconiosis' 65 as a consequence of in-
haling dust while working. The court concluded that "the statutory
period begins to run from the time when liability for [the] wrong
has arisen even though the injured party may be ignorant of the
existence of the wrong or injury .... ",166 The plaintiffs' causes
of action in tort had thus expired. 167 They had sued in tort, contract
and for breach of statutory duty more than three years after their
employment with defendants had ended but before the six year
statute of limitations for breach of contract and breach of statutory
duty had run. 16
While the Schmidt court recognized that the plaintiff was without
a remedy, it found that policy considerations favored strict inter-
pretation of the statute of limitations, noting that "[tihe Statute of
Limitations is a statute of repose. At times, it may bar the assertion
of a just claim. Then its application causes hardship. The legislature
has found that such occasional hardship is outweighed by the ad-
vantage of outlawing stale claims.' 1 69
In essence, the court read into the statute a theory of strict accrual
to which it adhered. Interestingly, potential hardship was avoided
in this precedent-setting case, as the court of appeals held that the
plaintiffs still had a cause of action for defendants' breach of a
statutory duty which had a six year limitation period.170 In subsequent
toxic substance decisions, the court of appeals applied this strict
accrual rule which neither had been expressly adopted by the leg-
islature nor caused hardship to the specific plaintiffs involved in
this case.'17
In Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., ' 2 the New York
Court of Appeals again acknowledged that a plaintiff could expe-
rience extreme hardship if courts did not apply a time-of-discovery
165. Pneumoconiosis is a chronic fibrous reaction in the lungs due to inhalation
of dust. STEDMAN'S MED. DICTIONARY 1108 (24th ed. 1982).
166. 270 N.Y. at 300, 200 N.E. at 827.
167. Id. at 301, 200 N.E. at 827. "[I]t cannot be doubted that the plaintiff
might have begun an action against the defendant immediately after he inhaled
the dust which caused the disease. . . . In that action the plaintiff could recover
all damages which he could show had resulted or would result therefrom." Id.
168. Id. at 302-03, 200 N.E. at 828.
169. Id. at 302, 200 N.E. at 827-28.
170. Id. at 306, 200 N.E. at 830 (N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 48(2) (1921)). The
present limitation period for breach of statutory duty is three years. Plaintiffs,
therefore, could not have utilized this cause of action to escape the hardship
imposed by the statute of limitations had the action been brought today. N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. LAW § 214(2) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1983-1984).
171. See infra notes 172-226 and accompanying text.
172. 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963).
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rule for personal injury actions,'73 but it decided that the legislature
had found that the detriment to defendants created by such a rule
would outweigh the concern for a plaintiff's lost cause of action. 17 4
The court suggested as legislative rationale for this outcome such
factors as "feigned cases"' 75 and "difficulties of proof." 7 6 The court,
therefore, upheld the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's
action commenced in 1959 for damages from cancer caused by the
defendant's failure to remove an x-ray detection substance from the
173. Id. at 218, 188 N.E.2d at 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
We should put aside the contention . . . that social change or advancement
in the sciences has so altered the subject matter upon which the law
operates that a different result is called for. The insidious and 'inherently
unknowable' nature of cancer and similar diseases was common knowledge
in 1936 when Schmidt was decided . . . [tihe adoption of and adherence
to the accrual rule by the Judges of our court from 1930 onward renders
the simple assertion 'it is unjust' inadequate.
Id.
174. Id. at 218, 188 N.E.2d at 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19.
While the plaintiff's equities are greater in one case, it was presumably
pursuant to a determination that the interests of an occasional claimant
were subordinate to society's interest in repose that resulted in the Statute
of Limitations in the first place. The existence of a discovery provision
in the fraud statute bespeaks a legislative judgment that only in fraud
cases . . . were there a sufficient number of unknown wrongs to justify
a departure from the general rule. Apparently the rarity of such un-
fortunate cases in other types of actions did not outweigh the disad-
vantages of imposing a possible exception to the grant of repose to every
person . . . who could be a potential defendant. . . . [P]erhaps the
possibility of feigned cases against unprepared defendants and the dif-
ficulties of proof in meritorious cases led to a decision that society is
best served by complete repose . . . even at the sacrifice of a few
unfortunate cases.
Id.
175. Id. at 218, 188 N.E.2d at 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 719. However, Chief Judge
Cooke in his dissent in Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co., noted that it is "quite
impossible to feign the medically certifiable presence of cancer." 62 N.Y.2d 888,
89:3, 467 N.E.2d 517, 520, 478 N.Y.S.2d 853, 856 (1984) (Cooke, C.J., dissenting);
see infra notes 205-21 for a discussion of Fleishman.
176. Chief Judge Cooke also noted that the passage of time seems to handicap
the plaintiff who attempts to determine which company manufactured the product
which allegedly caused his or her injuries. Contrastingly, the defendant will not
be at a disadvantage in litigation which involves a product of known chemical
composition. Moreover, the chemical composition of a product is known at ingestion
and determination of when the product "breaks" is not necessary as it is in other
product liability cases. The equities would thus appear to favor the plaintiff. 62
N.Y.2d at 893, 467 N.E.2d at 520, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 856; see also Drill & Hambleton,
Applying Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose, TRIAL, Nov. 1983, at
106, 112 (best-reasoned opinions note that plaintiff has no right to file lawsuit
without evidence of injury).
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plaintiff's sinuses in 1944.'17 Ultimately, the court of appeals con-
cluded that since the legislature had affirmatively added a time-of-
discovery provision to the statute of limitations in fraud cases, 7 ' it
could have done so in the area of products liability as well. 179 Since
the legislature had considered general time-of-discovery statute of
limitations provisions in the past but had rejected them, 180 it had
apparently determined that society did not require such provisions.'
Therefore, the Schwartz court refused to challenge this legislative
decision, and did not adopt a time-of-discovery rule.8 2 The court
has never waivered from this position in toxic substance cases since
the Schwartz decision.'8 3
There has been a compelling minority view expressed in recent
courts of appeals' decisions which rejects the strict accrual rule in
toxic tort cases. 8 4 In Thornton v. Roosevelt Hospital,'85 for example,
the plaintiff's decedent developed cancer in late 1972 or early 1973
after receiving an injection of thorium dioxide manufactured by
defendant Testagar, Inc. and administered by an employee of de-
fendant Roosevelt Hospital in 1954.86 In dismissing the action as
time-barred, the court of appeals concluded on the basis of Schwartz
that the injury had occurred when the drug was injected into the
body rather than when the cancer had formed and that the statute
177. 12 N.Y.2d at 219, 188 N.E.2d at 145-46, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
178. 12 N.Y.2d at 218-19, 188 N.E.2d at 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19. The
statute of limitations for an action based on fraud is codified in CPLR § 213:
"The following actions must be commenced within six years: .... .8. an action
based upon fraud; the time within which the action must be commenced shall be
computed from the time the plaintiff or person under whom he claims discovered
the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it." N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
LAW § 213 (8) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1983-1984).
179. 12 N.Y.2d at 218, 188 N.E.2d at 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19; see supra
note 174 and accompanying text.
180. Id. at 218-19, 188 N.E.2d at 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 719. N.Y. Legis. Doc.
65 [C] (1962); Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. 141-43 (1942).
181. Id. at 218-19, 188 N.E.2d at 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
182. 12 N.Y.2d at 218-19, 188 N.E.2d at 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19. Chief
Judge Desmond, joined by Judge Fuld, dissented arguing that a change of the
statute of limitations was required and that it was "perhaps unconstitutional to
hold that his time to sue expired before it was possible for him to learn of the
wrong." Id. at 219-20, 188 N.E.2d at 146, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 719-20 (Desmond,
C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality
of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1683, 1702
(1983) (statutes of limitations applied to toxic torts "destroy the only means available
for vindicating the victim's constitutionally protected right of personal security").
183. See infra notes 184-226 and accompanying text.
184. See infra notes 185-226 and accompanying text.
185. 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
186. Id. at 782, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
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of limitations should, therefore, accrue from the time of the in-
jection. 18 7
Judge Fuchsberg, in a strong dissent, noted that the plaintiff's
injury did not necessarily occur when the drug was injected but that
it also could have occurred when the process resulting in injury first
began regardless of whether the plaintiff was aware of it, or when
the injury manifested itself sufficiently to put the plaintiff on notice
that an injury had occurred. 8' Judge Fuchsberg stated that "[g]ood
sense and good law therefore require . ..that the injured user not
be foreclosed from having his day in court before he even has
knowledge of any injury and certainly not before any injury has
occurred."189 Moreover:
[wihat is Judge-made can be and, in appropriate cases, should
be Judge-unmade. Stare decisis is a malleable rule, not one bound
by bands of steel. As Roscoe Pound put it, "the law would break
if it could not bend". Indeed in recent years, we have given
recognition to the fact that the dynamic nature of personal injury
law calls upon us to "readily reexamine established precedent to
achieve the ends of justice in a more modern context."' 9
The judge noted that New York State "bucked the trend of products
law across the country" by not adopting a time-of-discovery rule
as a majority of jurisdictions had already done. 9 1 Judge Fuchsberg
drew an analogy between the accepted practice of excepting children
from statutes of limitations and the proposed practice of excepting
ignorant adult plaintiffs in toxic injury cases noting that both involve
similar policy considerations. 92 Judge Fuchsberg concluded by crit-
187. Id. at 781, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922. The court also ruled
that injection of the drug did not fall under the "foreign object" discovery exception
as codified in CPLR § 214-a. Id. See infra note 248 for the text of CPLR § 214-
a. See infra notes 246-60 for a discussion of the common law development of this
exception.
188. 47 N.Y.2d at 783, 391 N.E.2d at 1004, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 923 (Fuchsberg,
J., dissenting). Judge Fuchsberg carried this reasoning to its logical conclusion in
his dissent in Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 1013, 430 N.E.2d
1297, 1300-01, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, 247-48 (1981), where he concluded that the
question of when the toxic injury occurred, at inhalation or when the disease in
fact arose, is a question of fact for the jury and a complaint should not therefore
be summarily dismissed. See infra notes 194-204 for discussion of Steinhardt.
189. 47 N.Y.2d at 783-84, 391 N.E.2d at 1004, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 923 (Fuchsberg,
J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
190. Id. at 784, 391 N.E.2d at 1004-05, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 923 (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
191. Id. at 785, 391 N.E.2d at 1005, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting); see supra note 41 and accompanying text for these majority jurisdictions.
192. 47 N.Y.2d at 785, 391 N.E.2d at 1005, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (Fuchsberg,
J., dissenting).
We all recognize that it is wrong for a child too immature or too unaware
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icizing the court for its exercise of judicial restraint in the ingested
toxic substance situation. 93
Similarly, in Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., the court of
appeals reaffirmed the Schmidt last exposure rule of accrual for
latent disease cases. 94 The plaintiffs in Steinhardt had contracted a
disease caused by inhalation of asbestos at their place of employ-
ment. 95 The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' actions
noting that they had commenced their actions more than four years
after their last employment-related exposure to asbestos. 196 The court
reasoned that it was constrained by precedent and that alteration of the
strict accrual rule was reserved for the legislature. 197 Indeed, the
court noted that the legislature has acted to alter the accrual rule
only in Agent Orange cases. 198
Judge Fuchsberg again dissented sharply. The judge attacked the
notion that disease and hence, accrual, always begin when a toxic
substance is first ingested. 99 He noted plaintiffs' assertions that toxic
substances lay dormant for years without causing harm to the body
and concluded that the date of accrual should, therefore, be a
question for the triers of fact in these instances. 200 Judge Fuchsberg
also noted that the legislature had already made policy decisions in
of his or her right to act to be barred on that account. The adult victim
of a drug whose injurious effect, like that of a time bomb, is either
delayed or unknowable, is clearly as helpless to act as an infant. To the
extent that there very well may be some awareness in the case of the
infant, but none in the case of an adult . . . there may be even more
reason for the law to extend its protection to the adult.
Id.
193. Id. at 785, 391 N.E.2d at 1005-06, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting).
[T]his is hardly an appropriate matter on which to await legislative action.
That a right to recover should run from the time it is discoverable is
a matter of fundamental justice. It is an abdication of our own role in
the scheme of government to defer to the Legislature for rescue from
an [sic] unconscionable decisional law.
Id.
194. 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 1010, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246
(1981).
195. Id. at 1010, 430 N.E.2d at 1298, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1010-11, 430 N.E.2d at 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 246. "We believe it
to be inappropriate and injudicious to intrude into an area best suited for legislative
scrutiny." Id.
198. Id. at 1011 n.1, 430 N.E.2d at 1299 n.1, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 246 n.l; see
infra notes 227-45 and accompanying text for discussion of the Agent Orange
statute of limitations legislative exception.
199. 54 N.Y.2d at 1012-13, 430 N.E.2d at 1300, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 247 (Fuchsberg,
J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 1013, 430 N.E.2d at 1300-01, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 247-48; see also CANCER
CHEMICALS, supra note 7, at 23.
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situations where toxic tort claimants were unjustly foreclosed from
suit in Agent Orange cases.20 The fact that such policy had been
set forth by the legislature, the judge reasoned, should compel the
court to apply the rationale to all toxic substance cases to correct
judge-made law.20 2 The restriction of the exception to Agent Orange
claimants was merely the product of the legislative system of com-
promise, according to the judge, rather than an express edict not
to extend time-of-discovery to other toxic tort victims. 203 Arguably,
the court should be required to carry the legislature's pronouncement
to its equitable conclusion. In essence, the court should not allow
the slow-moving legislative bargaining process to deprive a particular
toxic tort victim of his day in court simply because the lobbyist for
"his disease" does not have bargaining strength in Albany.2°4
The court of appeals recently confirmed its strict accrual approach
for assimilated substances in Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co.2"5 In
Fleishman, the court affirmed two consolidated appellate division
decisions in a memorandum opinion.206 The first lower court decision,
Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co.,2 0 7 involved a plaintiff whose mother
had ingested diethylstilbestrol (DES) while she was pregnant with
the plaintiff. °2 0  In March, 1978, the plaintiff discovered that she had
201. 54 N.Y.2d at 1011, 430 N.E.2d at 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (Fuchsberg,
J., dissenting); see infra notes 227-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Agent Orange statute of limitations exceptions.
202. 54 N.Y.2d at 1011-12, 430 N.E.2d at 1299-1300, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 246-47
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). But see id. at 1010-11 n.1, 430 N.E.2d at 1299 n.1,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 246 n.1 ("As the dissent recognizes, the Legislature has acted but
has gone no further than 'Agent Orange' cases").
203. Id. at 1011-12 n.2, 430 N.E.2d at 1299-1300 n.2, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 246-47
n.2 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). "True, in the compromising fashion of legislative
bodies . . . these declarations were made applicable to 'Agent Orange' cases alone.
But, as with other social catalysts, what it accelerated was a return in this area
to the mainstream of legal thought." Id. But see id. at 1010-11, 430 N.E.2d at
1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 246 ("Further extension of the limited discovery provision
. . . was a matter best reserved for the Legislature, and not for the courts").
204. See infra notes 239-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inability
of the DES lobby to obtain legislative relief.
205. 62 N.Y.2d 888, 890, 467 N.E.2d 517, 518, 478 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854 (1984).
206. Id. at 890, 467 N.E.2d at 518, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
207. 96 A.D.2d 825, 465 N.Y.S.2d 735 (2d Dep't 1983).
208. Id. at 825, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 736 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). DES (Diethylstilbestrol) is a synthetic estrogen which was
administered to pregnant women who had histories of miscarriages. Both pregnant
women and the female offspring of such women have a greater chance of contracting
clear-cell adenocarcinoma. Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of the
Vagina, 284 NEW ENG. J. MED. 878-79 (1971); see also Note, Application of the
Pennsylvania Statute of Limitations Discovery Rule in DES Cases, 55 TEMP. L.
Q. 1149, 1151 (1982); Shields, Delayed Manifestation Injuries: The Statute of
Limitations as a Bar to DES Suits, II COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 127, 127-28
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cervical and vaginal cancer which required a complete hysterectomy. 0 9
In January and February, 1980, the plaintiff commenced suit against
four defendant drug companies, but the trial court dismissed the
actions as time-barred by the three year statute of limitations,210 and
the dismissal was affirmed by the appellate division.2"'
The second lower court decision, Manno v. Levi, 12 involved a
plaintiff who in 1969 had ingested DES prescribed by defendant Dr.
Levi and manufactured by defendant Lilly. 213 In 1981, the plaintiff
brought suit against the defendants after undergoing a mastectomy
to remove a cancerous breast in 1978, removal of fallopian tubes
and ovaries in 1980 and treatment for estrogen-related metastatic
bone disease which had spread through her vertebrae to her right
ribs and the right side of her skull by 1981.214 The trial court granted
the defendants' motions to dismiss 2  and the appellate division
reluctantly affirmed the dismissals in an opinion by Justice Brown
who concluded that "[t]he law as it now stands . . . mandates that
we decide this case against the weight of our profound sympathy. ' 2 6
The court of appeals affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs' actions
stating that since there was no showing in the record to depart from
precedent, any such departure "is a matter for the Legislature and
not the courts. '2 1 7 Chief Judge Cooke who had concurred with the
majority in Steinhardt"' and in Thornton21 9 vigorously dissented
(1979-1980). See generally C. ORENBERG, DES: THE COMPLETE STORY (1981).
209. 96 A.D.2d at 825, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
210. Id. at 825, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
211. Id. Justice Gibbons in a partial dissent, however, noted that "[wihile the
stale claim rationale of Statutes of Limitations is a sound one, in this case, it is
inapplicable. It is sought here to declare the bread stale before it is baked." 96
A.D.2d at 826, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 737 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Another consideration relevant to this case was the amendment of CPLR
§ 208 changing the age of majority from 21 to 18. (L. 1974, ch. 924). This
amendment, however, worked to deprive this plaintiff of her rights. Had the age
of majority still been twenty-one years, plaintiff would have had a cause of action
until age twenty-four since a disability such as minority tolls the statute of limitations.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 208 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). However, since the age
of majority was eighteen, this plaintiff's cause of action expired when she was
twenty-one. As the plaintiff was age twenty-three when she discovered her cancer,
she had no cause of action at the time she filed her claim. 96 A.D.2d at 825,
465 N.Y.S.2d at 736 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212. 94 A.D.2d 556, 465 N.Y.S.2d 219 (2d Dep't 1983).
213. Id. at 557, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
214. Id. at 557-58, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
215. Id. at 559, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
216. Id. at 575, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
217. 62 N.Y.2d at 890, 467 N.E.2d at 518, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
218. See supra notes 194-204 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
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in Fleishman noting that while stare decisis is necessary to maintain
the stability of law, it should not be "a shield behind which a court
may hide as reason for perpetuating unnecessary and profound
unfairness, which subjects the law to ridicule." 220 Chief Judge Cooke
further argued that fixing the date of accrual is not solely within
the province of the legislature, and that the policy considerations
such as feigned cases and fading memories no longer favor the
manufacturers of toxic chemicals. 221
Notwithstanding these vigorous dissents, the New York Court of
Appeals in the Schwartz,222 Thornton,223 Steinhardt224 and Fleishman25
cases deferred to the legislature while adhering to the rule of law
that accrual in toxic substances cases occurs at the time of ingestion,
inhalation or injection of the toxic substance. 226
C. Agent Orange Legislative Exception to the Strict Accrual Rule
The New York State legislature has promulgated a time-of-dis-
covery statute of limitations exception 227 for armed forces veterans
220. 62 N.Y.2d at 891, 467 N.E.2d at 518, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 854 (Cooke, C.J.,
dissenting); see also People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 489, 348 N.E.2d 894, 901,
384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 425 (1976) (courts readily reexamine tort case precedent to correct
precedent out of step with reasonable expectations of members of society); Woods
v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 354-55, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951) (law is not so inflexible
that it cannot correct itself from injustice espoused in prior decisions).
221. 62 N.Y.2d at 891-93, 467 N.E.2d at 519-20, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 855-56; see
also supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text for discussion of policy consid-
erations.
222. See supra notes 172-83 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 194-204 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 205-21 and accompanying text.
226. See also Reis v. Pfizer, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 664, 397 N.E.2d 390, 421 N.Y.S.2d
879 (1979) (plaintiff's action, filed in 1974, dismissed where plaintiff claimed he
was unaware he had contracted polio from son in 1967 when son given vaccine).
227. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 214-b (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). The New York
State Legislature, prior to passing the statute of limitations exceptions, established
a committee to investigate the health effects of Agent Orange on public and private
sector employees as well as on Vietnam veterans. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2475
(McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). The legislation provided for: a public information
program on dioxin including an effort to contact Vietnam veterans who may have
been exposed to Agent Orange; an epidemiological study of the health effects of
exposure to dioxin-containing herbicides; a central data bank to collect scientific
and medical literature on the health effects of exposure to dioxin; and an education
program for health professionals on the detection, diagnosis and treatment of
dioxin-related symptoms. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2475(l)(a)-(d).
Three states have passed special statutes of limitations for Agent Orange. See
infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text; see also Kulewicz, Agent Orange: The
States Fight Back, 44 OIO ST. L. J. 691, 694, 696 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Agent Orange]; NEW YORK STATE SENATE RESEARCH SERVICE, Temporary State
Commission on Dioxin Exposure, No. 84-9, at 5 (1984).
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exposed to Agent Orange 28 while serving in Indo-China from January
1, 1962 through May 7, 1975.229 Rhode Island and Ohio also have
statutes of limitations which apply exclusively to Agent Orange
claims23° and which serve to offset time-of-injury accrual periods in
228. Agent Orange is a phenoxy herbicide used during the Vietnam War to
defoliate Viet Cong guerrilla bases. Agent Orange, supra note 227, at 692. Agent
Orange contains 2, 3, 7, 8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) which may be one
of the most toxic chemicals known to man. Id. at 691-92. Agent Orange, so-called
because of the orange-striped drums in which it was shipped, was sprayed in Indo-
China between 1962 and 1972. Id. at 692. Approximately ten million gallons were
sprayed in Indo-China, exposing over 2 million Americans to the toxin. Id.; see
also Lacey and Lacey, Agent Orange: Government Responsibility for the Military
Use of Phenoxy Herbicides, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 137, 140-41 (1982). See generally
OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE, supra note 2, at 559-60. Exposure to Agent Orange has
been alleged to cause impaired liver function, chloracne, nephropathy, gastroin-
testinal irritation, depression and even cancer and genetic mutation. Agent Orange,
supra note 227, at 692.
229. CPLR § 214-b states:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, an action to
recover damages for personal injury caused by contact with or exposure
to phenoxy herbicides while serving as a member of the armed forces
of the United States in Indo-China from January first, nineteen hundred
sixty-two through May seventh, nineteen hundred seventy-five, may be
commenced within two years from the date of discovery of such injury,
or within two years from the date when through the exercise of reasonable
diligence the cause of such injury should have been discovered, whichever
is later.
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 214-b (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). As originally pro-
mulgated, the statute applied to veterans serving in Indo-China through March 29,
1973 only. 1981 N.Y. Laws 266, § 3. This was subsequently amended to include
servicemen in Indo-China through May 7, 1975. 1982 N.Y. Laws 153, § 1; see 1
WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE § 214-b (Supp. 1983) [here-
inafter cited as WEINSTEIN-KORN-MILLER].
230. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14.2 (Supp. 1984); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10
(Page Supp. 1982). The Rhode Island statute imposes a duty of reasonable diligence
on plaintiffs in the same manner as the New York State statute. Agent Orange,
supra note 227, at 712. The Rhode Island statute allows a plaintiff to sue three
years from discovery of injury rather than the two years that New York State
allows although it does not contain a revival provision for time-barred claims. The
Rhode Island statute states that:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, an action to
recover damages for personal injury caused by contact with or exposure
to phenoxy herbicides while serving as a member of the armed forces
of the Unites States in Indo-China from January first, nineteen hundred
sixty-two through March twenty-ninth, nineteen hundred seventy-three,
may be commenced within three (3) years from the date of the discovery
of such injury or within three (3) years from the date when through the
exercise of reasonable diligence the cause of such injury should have
been discovered, whichever is later.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14.2 (Supp. 1984).
The Ohio statute is more favorable to toxic tort plaintiffs than either the Rhode
Island or New York statutes. In Ohio, a cause of action will not accrue until a
physician advises an individual that his injuries are Agent Orange-related. See Agent
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these states."' The New York State statute, unlike the Rhode Island
and Ohio statutes, provides for the revival of time-barred claims
provided such claims are commenced no later than June 16, 1985.232
The legislative findings, however, are the most important aspect
of the statute as they provide a framework upon which future time-
of-discovery legislative proposals and judicial decisions could be
based. 233 First, the legislature concluded that there was "credible
Orange, supra note 227, at 711-12. Thus, even if a veteran reasonably knows that
he has suffered damages from Agent Orange exposure, his cause of action will
not accrue until a physician informs him of that fact. Id. The Ohio statute reads
in relevant part: "For purposes of this section, a cause of action for bodily injury
incurred by a veteran through exposure to chemical defoliants or herbicides or
other causative agents, including agent orange, arises upon the date on which the
plaintiff is informed by competent medical authority that he has been injured by
such exposure." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page Supp. 1982).
231. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14 (Supp. 1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10
(Page Supp. 1982). Accrual in product liability cases in Rhode Island has been
judicially defined as "time of injury." Plouffe v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,
118 R.I. 288, 293, 373 A.2d 492, 495 (1977). Accrual under the Ohio statute of
limitations has generally been at the time the wrongful act was committed. Minster
Loan and Savings Co. v. Laufersweiler, 67 Ohio App. 375, 379, 36 N.E.2d 895,
897 (1940) (cause of action against former officers and directors accrues when ultra
vires acts committed but not when corporation discovers the acts). But see McKenna
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 667 (3d Cir. 1980) (time-of-discovery
rule applied in suit against drug manufacturer for injuries suffered from defendant's
birth control pills), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980).
232. 1983 N.Y. Laws 358, § 4. This section provides that:
Every cause of action for an injury or death caused by contact with or
exposure to phenoxy herbicides while serving as a member of the armed
forces of the United States in Indo-China from January first, nineteen
hundred sixty-two through May seventh, nineteen hundred seventy-five,
which is or would be barred . . . prior to June sixteenth, nineteen
hundred eighty-five, because the applicable period of limitation has expired
is hereby revived or extended as the case may be, and an action thereon
may be commenced and prosecuted provided such action is commenced
I .. not later than June sixteenth, nineteen hundred eighty-five.
Id. (underlines in statute indicating amended text omitted). As originally promul-
gated, the legislation provided for revival of any action commenced one year from
the effective date of the Act, or, through June 16, 1982. 1981 N.Y. Laws 266, §
4. However, 1982 legislation extended the revival period to June 16, 1983. 1982
N.Y. Laws 153, § 2. The 1983 amendment extended the period to the present June
16, 1985. 1983 N.Y. Laws 358, § 4; see WEINSTEIN-KORN-MLLER, supra note 229,
at § 214-b.01. This provision was consistent with a court of appeals decision in
which the court held that the legislature may revive a personal cause of action
where circumstances are exceptional and serious injustice would result to innocent
plaintiffs. Gallewski v. Hentz & Co., 301 N.Y. 164, 93 N.E.2d 620 (1950) (broker
sold decedent's securities in 1940 in violation of agreement while decedent was in
concentration camp; administrator sued in 1948 after statute of limitations had
expired but action held not time-barred and action revived).
233. 1981 N.Y. Laws 266, § 1. The New York State exception was promulgated
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scientific evidence" that exposure to Agent Orange caused "serious
physical disabilities. 23 4 It continued with a description of its mo-
tivations in enacting CPLR section 214-b and its justification for so
doing:
[T]he legislature ha[s] been principally motivated by the desire to
discourage "belated litigation." Belated litigation [does] not serve
the interests of justice since protracted delays in litigating issues
result[s] in the failing memory of witnesses and the disappearance
of evidence that [is] relevant and germane to such issues. It was
never the intent of the legislature in imposing limitations, to
foreclose the citizens of this state from prosecuting legitimate
claims, provided such claims are diligently and expeditiously pur-
sued. An exception to the general period of limitation rule is
required when the pathological effect of an injury occurs without
while a massive federal class action suit was in progress in which veterans and
their dependents sued the government and chemical companies for personal injuries
allegedly caused by their exposure to Agent Orange. See In re Diamond Shamrock
Chem. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1417 (1984); "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1128 (1981); 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); 91 F.R.D. 618 (E.D.N.Y.); 506
F. Supp. 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); 506 F. Supp. 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); 506 F. Supp.
753 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); 506 F. Supp. 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); 475 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); see also Agent Orange, supra note 227, at 693 n.17.
While recovery against the government has been barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, 506 F. Supp. at 769-82, seven manufacturers have agreed to create a
$180 million fund for Vietnam veterans and their families who were allegedly
harmed by Agent Orange. Fried, Judge Tentatively Approves Pact on Agent Orange,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1984, at B3, col. 1. Judge Weinstein of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York tentatively approved the
settlement pending the outcome of hearings in March, 1985 for distribution of the
settlement. Id.; see also Blumenthal, Veterans Accept $180 Million Pact on Agent
Orange, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1984, at 1, col. 6. One impetus for passage of an
Agent Orange exception in 1981 may have been the fact that state statutes of
limitation applied in the class action. 635 F.2d at 995 (plaintiffs' claims not governed
by federal common law); see also Yates, Atomic Fallout and Agent Orange, 13
THE BRIEF 5 (1984) (thousands of plaintiffs were dismissed because state statutes
of limitations had expired).
234. 1981 N.Y. Laws 266, § 1. One commentator has noted that such presumptions
may ultimately discredit the results of state-supported research programs. Agent
Orange, supra note 227, at 694. The actual adverse health effects of Agent Orange
are still largely unknown. Lyons, U.S. Embarks on $100 Million Study of Agent
Orange, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1984, at C3, col. 1. Only recently has a federally
sponsored program to study the health consequences of exposure to Agent Orange
commenced. Id. The study entitled, The Veterans Health Programs Extension and
Improvement Act of 1979, set forth at 38 U.S.C. § 219(a)(l)(A) (Supp. 1984), was
embroiled for several years in "bureaucratic bickering" before being transferred
to the Federal Center for Disease Control in Atlanta. Id. The medical studies have
since been commenced there under the direction of Dr. Peter M. Layde. Id.
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perceptible trauma, and the victim is blamelessly ignorant of the
cause of the injury. 211
The legislature went on to find that a time-of-discovery statute of
limitations rule should be applicable to claims by Vietnam veterans
exposed to phenoxy herbicides who had suffered latent disabilities.
23 6
The legislature further found that the state had a "strong moral
obligation to revive time-barred causes of action" in such cases.
23 7
From these legislative findings, it would appear that New York State
should have an even greater moral obligation to provide relief to
individuals suffering from latent disabilities caused by other toxic
substances where the causal relation to disease has been more sub-
stantially confirmed than has the Agent Orange causal relation.2 3
For example, in enacting a 1978 public health law to study the
DES problem in New York State,239 the New York State Legislature
found that approximately 100,000 New York State residents had
been exposed to DES prenatally.240 Additionally, the legislature stated
that a causal connection had been found between DES and a type
of cancer in the female offspring of those who had ingested the
drug while pregnant. 4 ' Arguably, the State has a greater obligation
to DES claimants who, according to the legislature itself, have more
than "credible scientific evidence" supporting their claims. 24' This
legislative inconsistency tends to support Judge Fuchsberg's conten-
tion in Steinhardt241 that the failure to extend the time-of-discovery
exception to all toxic tort victims was merely a product of the
legislative system of compromise rather than an express directive by
the legislature to exclude toxic tort claimants from the time-of-
discovery rule.'" Therefore, the legislature must resolve the incon-
235. 1981 N.Y. Laws 266, § 1.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Following studies by Dr. Irving J. Selikoff and others in the early 1970's,
the causal link between mesothelioma and asbestos exposure was established. Me-
haffy, Asbestos-Related Lung Disease, 16 FORUM 341, 344 (1980). Courts have
accepted causation as a matter of law ever since. Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiological
Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 746 n.56 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Epidemiologic Proof]. But cf. Keller, Quite Contrary View on Asbestos,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1984, at B4, col. 4 (research mineralogist for United States
Geological Survey believes that scientific misunderstanding of asbestos has bred
panic among politicians and public).
239. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-C (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
240. 1978 N.Y. Laws 715, § I.
241. Id.; see supra note 208 for a discussion of the physical consequences of
DES ingestion.
242. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
243. 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1981).
244. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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sistencies which it has created. Should it fail to do so, the court
of appeals should act on the findings of the legislature that "[a]n
exception . . is required . . when the victim is blamelessly ignorant
of the cause of the injury. 245
D. The Foreign Object Legislative Exception to the Strict Accrual
Rule
The New York Court of Appeals liberalized the accrual rule
governing medical malpractice cases involving a foreign object which
had been left in the patient's body during an operation when it
adopted the time-of-discovery statute of limitations rule in Flanagan
v. Mount Eden General Hospital.246 It is important to note that the
state legislature did not attempt to reverse the Flanagan decision,
which was considered by the Flanagan dissent to be an example of
judicial legislation,2 47 by adopting a strict accrual or time-of-injury
accrual rule in the CPLR. In fact, the Flanagan decision was sub-
sequently codified by the legislature.2 41
In Flanagan, the court distinguished a foreign object case from
the toxic substance case by noting that a patient's claim could not
be feigned or frivolous in the foreign object case since the object
245. 1981 N.Y. Laws 266, § 1.
246. 24 N.Y.2d 427, 431, 248 N.E.2d 871, 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 27 (1969)
("Statute of Limitations will not begin to run until the patient could have reasonably
discovered the malpractice").
247. 24 N.Y.2d at 441, 248 N.E.2d at 880, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 35 ("Such a ...
system does not lend itself, properly, to judicial gloss, so extensive as to be
tantamount to substantial amendment") (Breitel, J., dissenting).
248. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
An action for medical malpractice must be commenced within two years
and six months of the act, omission or failure complained of or last
treatment where there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury
or condition which gave rise to the said act, omission or failure; provided,
however, that where the action is based upon the discovery of a foreign
object in the body of the patient, the action may be commenced within
one year of the date of such discovery or of the date of discovery of
facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier.
For the purpose of this section the term "continuous treatment" shall
not include examinations undertaken at the request of the patient for
the sole purpose of ascertaining the state of the patient's condition. For
the purpose of this section the term "foreign object" shall not include
a chemical compound, fixation device or prosthetic aid or device.
Id.; see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
The state legislature also codified the continuous treatment exception to the
accrual of a medical malpractice claim which had previously been established by
the New York Court of Appeals. Where the doctor commits malpractice but
continues to treat the plaintiff for the same injury, the statute of limitations runs
from the last treatment. Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d
777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962) (negligence claim against New York City Hospital
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retains its identity in the patient's body.2 49 Since the object retains
its identity, no professional diagnostic judgment is required and
"defendant's ability to defend a 'stale' claim is not unduly im-
paired. ' 250 Yet, it has also been pointed out that it is equally difficult
to feign the medically verifiable signs of cancer that are present in
toxic tort cases. 25'
The dissenting opinion of Judge Breitel, joined by Judges Scileppi
and Jasen, argued that the majority had wrongfully engaged in
judicial legislation in adopting the time-of-discovery rule. 2 2 Judge
Keating, the author of the Flanagan opinion, addressed the dissent's
contention that the legislature's failure to pass a time-of-discovery
rule indicated disapproval of such a rule. Judge Keating stated that
since various medical malpractice time-of-discovery bills were never
discussed in the legislature, it would be unwise to assume legislative
disapproval, particularly since the assembly and the senate had always
passed time-of-discovery measures when given the opportunity to
deliberate and vote upon such bills.253 Until 1975, when the legislature
passed CPLR section 214-a, no such rule had been passed by the two
bodies simultaneously.2 4 Judge Keating concluded that the strict
accrual rule was a judge-made rule from the outset and a judge-
accrues at end of continuous treatment at hospital); see also McDermott v. Torre,
56 N.Y.2d 399, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1982) (patient who sued
doctor for misdiagnosed malignancy must have in fact returned to doctor for
purpose of treating matter related to initial treatment in order to toll statute of
limitations); O'Laughlin v. Salamanca Hosp. Dist. Auth., 36 A.D.2d 51, 319
N.Y.S.2d 128 (4th Dep't 1971) (patient's claim against hospital for injuries suffered
from fall from hospital bed accrued upon release from hospital after treatment of
injuries rather than upon fall from bed).
249. 24 N.Y.2d at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27.
250. Id. at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
251. See supra note 175.
252. 24 N.Y.2d at 441, 248 N.E.2d at 879, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 35 (Breitel, J.,
dissenting).
253. Id. at 433 n.5, 248 N.E.2d at 874 n.5, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 28-29 n.5.
No one knows why the legislature did not pass a proposed measure.
Admittedly, if the bill had been discussed in both houses and defeated,
this would be an indication of the legislature's purpose. With regard to
the ...proposals before the legislature ...no such consideration ever
took place .... Are we to hold that a majority of a legislative committee,
who give no reason for their failure to allow the whole body to vote
on a measure impart a legislative judgment which must be transmitted
to a conclusive legislative intent? . . . "legislative inaction is a weak
reed upon which to lean in determining legislative intent."
Id. at 433, 248 N.E.2d at 874, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 28 (citations omitted).
254. 24 N.Y.2d at 433 n.5, 248 N.E.2d at 874-75 n.5, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 28-29
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made time-of-discovery rule merely served to update the common
law.
255
While the Flanagan decision seemed to foreshadow a general
revamping of the statute of limitations accrual period for all types
of products liability cases, the court of appeals has since construed
the decision rather narrowly. 2 6 However, several lower court decisions
have broadened the definition of foreign object. 257 Nonetheless, the
court of appeals construed the Flanagan decision narrowly in Martin
by choosing not to adopt the foreign object time-of-discovery rule
in medical implant cases.258 The court reasoned that implantation or
255. Id. at 434, 248 N.E.2d at 875, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
The Legislature did not provide that the Statute of Limitations should
run from the time of the medical malpractice. This court did. Therefore,
a determination that the time of accrual is the time of discovery is no
more judicial legislation than was the original determination. Granted,
the Legislature could have acted to change our rule; however, we would
surrender our own function if we were to refuse to deliberate upon
unsatisfactory court-made rules simply because a period of time has
elapsed and the Legislature has not seen fit to act. . . . Negligence law
is common law, and the common law has been molded and changed
and brought up-to-date in many another case. Our court said, long ago,
that it had not only the right, but the duty to re-examine a question
where justice demands it.
Id.
256. See Beary v. City of Rye, 44 N.Y.2d 398, 414-15, 377 N.E.2d 453, 459,
406 N.Y.S.2d 9, 15 (1978) (legislature expressly prohibited inclusion of chemical
compounds, fixation devices and prosthetic aids from term foreign object; thus,
Flanagan could not be broadened beyond its existing confines). Lower courts have
also failed to broaden the Flanagan decision. See, e.g., Famulare v. Huntington
Hosp., 78 A.D.2d 547, 547, 432 N.Y.S.2d 33, 33-34 (2d Dep't 1980) (foreign object
must be something doctor introduced and, therefore, fragment of broken tooth
left in patient's lip did not consitute foreign object); Soto v. Greenpoint, 76 A.D.2d
928, 929, 429 N.Y.S.2d 723, 724 (2d Dep't 1980) (failure to find toy lodged in
throat constituted misdiagnosis and therefore did not come under foreign objects
exception); Florio v. Cook, 65 A.D.2d 548, 549, 408 N.Y.S.2d 949, 951 (2d Dep't
1978) (leaving part of tumor in body not tantamount to leaving foreign object in
body), aff'd, 48 N.Y.2d 792, 399 N.E.2d 947, 423 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1979).
257. See Ooft v. City of New York, 80 A.D.2d 888, 888, 437 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31
(2d Dep't 1981) (time-of-discovery rule applies when doctor fails to remove I.U.D.
before inserting new one); Dobbins v. Clifford, 39 A.D.2d 1, 3-4, 330 N.Y.S.2d
743, 746-47 (4th Dep't 1972) (time-of-discovery rule applies when doctor injures
plaintiff's pancreas while removing plaintiff's spleen and injury discovered four
years later; real evidence in form of hospital records available; no involvement of
professional diagnostic judgment and no danger of false claims); LeVine v. Isoserve,
Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 747, 751-52, 334 N.Y.S.2d 796, 801 (Sup. Ct. Albany County
1972) (time-of-discovery rule applied in ordinary negligence suit when plaintiff was
exposed to radioactive isotope); see also Note, Denial of a Remedy: Former Residents
of Hazardous Waste Sites and New York's Statute of Limitations, 8 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 161, 168-69 (1982).
258. 60 N.Y.2d at 427, 457 N.E.2d at 1155-56, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29.
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insertion occurs with the patient's knowledge, and the patient can
provide this information to a doctor who subsequently may be diagnos-
ing body ailments.2 " The Martin decision, however, did create a time-
of-injury exception26 to the general strict accrual rule. This action
indicates that the court of appeals will resort to interpreting the mean-
ing of "accrual" in the general statute of limitations where the
legislature has failed to act and where the interests of justice and
equity so demand.
V. Alternative Proposals for Time-of-Discovery Accrual
On March 12, 1984, the New York State Assembly unanimously
passed Assembly Bill A. 3547-A 261 which would have added a two
year time-of-discovery provision to CPLR section 214.62 This provision
would have provided for accrual, not only upon plaintiff's discovery
of injury, but also upon plaintiff's discovery that injury had been
259. Id.
260. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
261. Assemblyman M. Miller, Factual Information in Support of a Discovery
Rule Statute of Limitations for Victims of Toxic Torts in New York State (May
8, 1.984) (available in Fordham University School of Law Library) [hereinafter cited
as Fact Sheet]. The bill was introduced by assemblymen Robin Schimminger,
Alexander B. "Pete" Grannis, Maurice D. Hinchey, Melvin H. Miller, May W.
Newburger, Ivan C. Lafayette and Joseph T. Pillittere. N.Y. A. 3547-A, 207 Reg.
Sess. (1983-1984).
262. Section 2 of A. 3547-A states in relevant part:
§ 2. Such law and rules is [sic] amended by adding a new section two
hundred fourteen-c to read as follows: § 214-c. Action; commence. (a)
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary (except for section 214-
a), where the time to commence an action has otherwise expired, an
action to recover damages for personal injury, illness or death, or injury
to property, caused by the latent effects of exposure, direct or indirect,
to a substance, material, element or particle upon or within the body
or upon or within property as the case may be, may be commenced
within two years from the date of discovery of the illness or injury, or
the date of death, or the discovery of the cause of such injury, illness,
or death, whichever is later. Provided, however, that where the injury
or illness is damage to the respiratory system or other system, part or
function of the body caused by exposure to a substance, material, element
or particle, the effects of such exposure being latent and not manifested
upon exposure, the time for commencement of an action or proceeding
to recover damages for such injury or illness shall be the latter of the
following:
1. within two years after the date the plaintiff first suffered disability;
or
2. within two years after the date the plaintiff discovered that such
disability was caused or contributed to by such exposure.
(b) Punitive damages may be awarded if the plaintiff shows by clear
and convincing evidence that the injury or illness, or death suffered was
19851 TIME-OF-DISCO VERY RULE
caused by exposure to a toxic substance.2 63 The bill also would have
revived for one year plaintiffs' toxic tort claims which had expired
as of the effective date of the legislation. 64 Though the state assembly
has passed similar bills in four consecutive legislative sessions, the
proposal has never appeared on a senate committee agenda nor been
voted upon by the full senate. 265
In May, 1984, however, a senate version of the time-of-discovery
the result of the defendant's reckless disregard for the safety of product
users, consumers, or any other persons who might be harmed by the
product. Such damages may not be awarded in the absence of an award
for compensatory damages.
(c) In this section:
1. "Disability" means the inability to perform a person's regular work
or occupation or the inability to perform regular daily activities as a
result of exposure.
2. "Exposure" means contact, absorption, injection, ingestion or inhal-
ation.
N.Y. A. 3547-A, 207 Reg. Sess. 2 (1983-1984) (underlines indicating new matter
omitted).
263. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
264. Section 4 of A. 3547-A provides:
Every cause of action for personal injury, illness or death, or injury to
property caused by the latent effects of contact, absorption, injection,
exposure, ingestion, or inhalation, direct or indirect, to a substance,
material, element or particle upon or within the body or upon or within
property, which is barred as of the effective date of this act because
the applicable period of limitation has expired, is hereby revived and an
action thereon may be commenced within one year from the effective
date hereof; provided, however, that this section shall not apply to any
claim or action for damages, including third party claims, whether made
or brought directly or indirectly against the state, or political subdivision
thereof, any public corporation, department, board, bureau, division,
agency, commission, authority, or officer or employee of any of the
foregoing.
N.Y. A. 3547-A, 207 Reg. Sess. 3 (1983-1984).
265. See Fact Sheet, supra note 261, at 1; Gargan, Panel in Albany Urged to
Extend Toxic Suit Time, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1984, at B2, col. 1 [hereinafter cited
as Albany Panel]. The time-of-discovery legislation has consistently been blocked
from a full senate vote by Senate Majority Leader Warren Anderson (R-Binghamton).
Charles Dumas, a spokesman for Anderson, stated that "[N]o one would want to
do business in New York State [if a time-of-discovery rule were enacted]. And
New York is in a sticky situation with business right now." Mitchell, Cancer Victims
Caught in Middle of NY Debate, Newsday, May 2, 1984, at 15, col. 1 [hereinafter
cited as N.Y. Debate].
The State Health Commissioner, David Axelrod, however, has estimated that
only twenty-seven cases of DES-related cancer may now exist in New York State.
See N. Y. Debate, supra note 265, at 15, col. 2. It is questionable whether passage
of a time-of-discovery measure would harm business enough to warrant blocking
these plaintiffs' claims. Moreover, it is doubtful that business could flee anywhere
else given the trend towards time-of-discovery toxic tort statutes of limitations in
the other states. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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bill was considered by a state senate committee for the first time. 266
The bill, S. 9158, was drafted by the chairman of the Senate Codes
Committee, Republican Ronald B. Stafford.267 Senate bill S. 9158
was more restrictive than the assembly version, however, as it required
a plaintiff to exercise reasonable diligence in discovering his injury. 261
Moreover, the senate proposal did not require discovery of causation
before the statute of limitations would begin to run. 269 Thus, under
A. 3547-A, a plaintiff would have to discover his injury as well as
the cause of his injury before the statute of limitations would begin
to run, while under S. 9158, a plaintiff would only have to discover
the injury itself before the statute of limitations accrued. 271 In spite
of these flaws, assembly and senate proponents of a time-of-discovery
accrual rule supported the senate bill. 7'
The senate proposal ultimately died in committee without coming
to a full vote in the senate as a number of senators, including
Senator Stafford, chose to support a proposed comprehensive prod-
266. See Albany Panel, supra note 265, at B2.
267. N.Y. S. 9158, 207 Reg. Sess. (1984). S. 9158, titled, "AN ACT to amend
the civil practice law and rules, in relation to time limitations to commence an
action to recover damages for injury caused by exposure to toxic or harmful
substances," was introduced on May 3, 1984. The bill provided, in pertinent part:
§ 2. Such law and rules is amended by adding a new section two hundred
fourteen-c to read as follows: § 214-c. Actions to recover damages for
personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of
exposure to a toxic or harmful substance.
(a) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary (except for
section two hundred fourteen-a of this article) where the time to commence
an action has otherwise expired, an action to recover damages for personal
injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to
a toxic or harmful substance may be commenced within two years from
the date of discovery of the injury or within two years from the date
when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should
have been discovered, whichever is earlier.
(b) In this section "exposure" means direct or indirect exposure by
absorption, contact, ingestion, inhalation or injection. ...
§ 4. Every cause of action for personal injury or injury to property
caused by a toxic or harmful substance . . . which is barred as of the
effective date of this act because the applicable period of limitation has
expired, is hereby revived and an action thereon may be commenced
within one year from the effective date hereof . ...
Id. at 2 (underlines indicating new matter omitted).
268. See supra note 267.
269. Id.; see also supra notes 64-78 for discussion of the federal courts' approach
under the Federal Tort Claims Act which requires discovery of causation before
the statute of limitations commences to run.
270. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text for different types of time-
of-discovery rules.
271. See Fact Sheet, supra note 261, at 1-2.
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ucts liability bill. 272 Senate bill S. 10051, while containing a time-
of-discovery provision,273 also included several onerous provisions
which offset the possible benefits of the time-of-discovery provision
contained therein. 274
One of the failings of S. 10051 was its exclusion of the broad
revival clause which constituted section four of A. 3547-A. 275 The
senate bill instead limited the revival of time-barred claims to injured
plaintiffs with clear-cell adenocarcinoma who had ingested DES or
whose mothers had ingested DES during their pregnancies while they
were domiciliaries of New York State.2 76 The limited revival period
272. S. 10051 was introduced on June 25, 1984, by Senators Ronald B. Stafford,
James J. Lack, Norman J. Levy, Martin S. Auer, H. Douglas Barclay, John D.
Calandra, Martin Connor, Walter J. Floss, Jr.; John E. Flynn, Mary B. Goodhue,
Roy M. Goodman, Donald M. Halperin, Owen H. Johnson, L. Paul Kehoe, Martin
J. Knorr, Kenneth P. Lavalle, Franz S. Leichter, Tarky Lombardi, Jr., Ralph J.
Marino, Howard C. Nolan, Jr., Frank Padavan, Joseph R. Pisani, J.P. Rolison,
Jr., Richard E. Schermerhorn, William T. Smith, III, Martin M. Solomon, Caesar
Trunzo, Michael J. Tully, Jr. and Jeremy S. Weinstein. N.Y. S. 10051, 207 Reg.
Sess. (1984).
273. N.Y. S. 10051, 207 Reg. Sess. 2, § 2 (1984).
274. Section 2 of S. 10051 contains a reasonable diligence clause but does not
require discovery of causation before the statute of limitations accrues. N.Y. S.
10051, 207 Reg. Sess. 2, § 2 (1984).
275. See supra note 264; News: From Assemblyman Melvin Miller, Assembly
Denounces Senate "Compromise" Tort Bill (June 26, 1984) (available in Fordham
University School of Law Library) [hereinafter cited as Assembly News].
276. Section 6 grants DES claimants an additional year in which to file a claim
and states:
§ 6. a. Pursuant to the provisions of chapter seven hundred fifteen of
the laws of nineteen hundred seventy-eight, the legislature recognized the
public importance of identifying, screening, diagnosing, caring for and
treating persons exposed to diethylstilbestrol and other synthetic estrogens,
commonly known as "DES." After approximately thirty years of pre-
scription of DES by physicians to pregnant women to alleviate certain
complications of pregnancy, a statistical association between prenatal
exposure to DES and clear-cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina or cervix
was discovered and reported on in the medical literature in nineteen
hundred seventy-one.
Such compelling circumstances impose a strong moral obligation on
the state to provide additional time in which to sue for causes of action
that have accrued in favor of such citizens of this state. Therefore, the
legislature by the enactment of this act provides an additional year within
which to commence an action for damages to individuals who can
demonstrate (1) exposure in utero to DES, and (2) diagnosis of clear-
cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina or cervix.
b. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, an action to recover
damages for injury or death resulting from clear-cell adenocarcinoma of
the vagina or cervix caused by in utero exposure to DES which is barred
as of the effective date of this act because the applicable period of
limitation expired is hereby revived for any person, or the personal
representatives of any person, whose mother was prescribed and who
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also was extended to certain employees of the tungsten carbide
industry.277 This narrow revival effectively foreclosed those time-
barred claimants who were unable to garner the lobbying strength
needed to have "their diseases" included in the bill."'8 Additionally,
used DES during the term of her pregnancy provided such person's: (i)
mother, at any time during the term of her pregnancy, had a residence
in this state or was domiciled in this state or (ii) such person had a
residence in this state or was domiciled in this state at the time the
condition was diagnosed. Such an action may be commenced and pros-
ecuted provided such action is commenced within one year of the effective
date of this act. The provision of this act shall not apply nor be deemed
to revive any cause of action against a licensed physician or pharmacist.
N.Y. S. 10051, 207 Reg. Sess. 4-5 (1984).
It should be noted that under this provision, plaintiffs would still have no claim
against doctors. See also supra notes 239-42 for discussion of Public Health Law
§ 2500-C which originally linked DES with cancer nearly six years ago. There is
still no relief to DES plaintiffs from the statute of limitations to date. See supra
note 208 for a discussion of 'the physical consequences of DES ingestion.
277. Section 7 of the senate proposal provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, every cause
of action for personal injury or death caused by the latent effects of
exposure to tungsten or cobalt through contact, ingestion or inhalation,
direct or indirect, upon or within the body, to employees of any company
engaged in the' cemented tungsten carbide industry in New York State
during the years nineteen hundred fifty through nineteen hundred eighty-
two inclusive, and which company is no longer engaged in said business
in this state, and which cause of action is or would be barred prior to
the effective date of this act because the applicable statute of limitation
has run is hereby revived or extended, as the case may be, and an action
thereon may be commenced not later than one year from the effective
date of this act.
N.Y. S. 10051, 207 Reg. Sess. 5 (1984). Tungsten carbide, which is the hardest
substance next to the diamond, consists of between three and twenty-five percent
cobalt particles. Ex- Workers Contend Cobalt Dust in Factory Caused Lung Ailment,
N.Y. Times, June 3, 1984, § 1, at 55, col. 1. Tungsten carbide is used in the
manufacture of industrial-tool parts and when cobalt particles are inhaled by
employees, their lungs may become permanently scarred. Id. Section 7 will provide
a one year revival period for approximately seventy claimants in New York State
who were employed by a tungsten-carbide factory in Syracuse, New York which
closed in 1982. Id.
278. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
legislative bargaining system. In a 1978 case, Judge Fuchsberg in his majority
opinion stated that:
[a legislator] may not only be expected to bring his knowledge and
opinions to bear on the proposals before him, but to share them with
his legislative confreres as well. After all, as a legislator he is a member
of a body which has been tellingly described as "a bargaining institution
.. a means by which society settles its accounts among various groups."
O'Malley v. Macejka, 44 N.Y.2d 530, 533-34, 378 N.E.2d 88, 90, 406 N.Y.S.2d
725, 726 (1978) (offices of town assessor and county board members not incompatible
so that one person may hold both offices) (quoting Prendergast, Professional
Approach to Advocacy in a Legislature, 34 ALBANY L. REv. 69, 70, 75 (1969)).
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S. 10051 eliminated, to the detriment of injured plaintiffs, collateral
estoppe 7 9 and joint and several liability80 in certain situations.28
While early indications, including support from Governor Mario
Cuomo, 28 2 pointed towards passage of some type of time-of-discovery
provision, none of the assembly or senate proposals had been con-
sidered by the full senate by the end of the regular session on July
1, 1984.283 Presumably, objections to a broad time-of-discovery pro-
vision by defendant interests 2 4 and to the narrow revival clause in
279. The collateral estoppel doctrine provides that "when an issue of ultimate
fact has been determined by a valid judgment, that issue cannot be again litigated
between the same parties in future litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 237 (5th
ed. 1979).
280. Joint and several liability attaches when tortfeasors may be sued by a
plaintiff either separately or together at plaintiff's discretion. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
751, 753 (5th ed. 1979).
281. Section 4 of S. 10051 adds a new article 14-B to the CPLR. N.Y. S. 10051,
207 Reg. Sess. 2-4 (1984). The article effectively eliminates the concept of joint
and several liability by providing that a party shall be liable only "for that portion
• . . awarded as damages to any plaintiff in the proportion that the amount of
. . . culpable conduct bears to the amount of the culpable conduct attributable
to all persons subject to liability, whether or not an action has been brought or
a judgment rendered against such person." Id. at 3; see also Epidemiologic Proof,
supra note 238, at 782-84 for a discussion of proportional recovery in toxic tort
litigation.
Section 6 of the senate proposal forbids the use of collateral estoppel in claims
which have been revived. "[Ilt would be manifestly unfair to permit either a
claimant or defendant in any action to establish any fact necessary to make the
determinations . . . by showing that an identical or similar issue of fact was
determined adversely to the claimant or the defendant in another action brought
by another claimant .... ." N.Y. S. 10051, 207 Reg. Sess. 5 (1984). The use of
collateral estoppel in asbestos litigation has been analyzed by several commentators.
See, e.g., Baldwin, Asbestos Litigation and Collateral Estoppel, 17 FORUM 772
(1982); Note, Applying Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Asbestos Cases: A Viable
Alternative, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 687 (1982).
282. See Albany Panel, supra note 265, at B2, col. 3.
283. Id. Oreskes, Albany Pas de Deux, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1984, at B2, col.
1. Liberal members of the state senate attributed the failure of several legislative
measures during 1984 to Governor Cuomo's reluctance to fight hard for them.
Governor Cuomo, in reply, stated that the thirty-five member Republican majority
in the senate was a much too formidable obstacle to overcome. Id. There was no
1984 election-year shift in the current 35-to-26 Republican majority in the state
senate while Republicans gained four seats in the assembly, thereby reducing the
Democratic majority in that body to 94-to-56. Peterson, Republicans Gain in State
Legislatures, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1984, § 1, at 18, col. 6; see also The Returns
Across New York in Campaigns for Seats in State Legislature, N.Y. Times, Nov.
8, 1984, at BI 1, col. 1 (tabulations of New York State senate and assembly races).
284. Opponents of the legislation who allege that a time-of-discovery rule would
increase the cost of insurance premiums and ultimately drive out business, could
be characterized as alarmist at best. Assemblyman Melvin H. Miller, by letter dated
December 6, 1983, polled the Commissioners of Insurance for the fifty states about
the effect a time-of-discovery statute of limitations has had on insurance premiums
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S. 10051 by plaintiff interests"' led to the demise of any proposed
time-of-discovery legislation.
Any future New York State time-of-discovery legislative proposal
should adopt the broad revival clause and discovery-of-causation
requirement proposed in the assembly bill A. 3547-A.28 6 Indeed, there
is precedent for such legislation in CPLR section 214-b, the Agent
Orange exception. 28 7 An amendment to the general strict accrual
and business in their states. The letter asked:
1) If your state has adopted either a discovery statute . . . or a revival
statute, what has been your state's experience in insurance premiums for
drug companies, asbestos manufacturers, etc .... Have insurance pre-
miums increased since adoption of a discovery rule or a revival statute?
By what percent? 2) Has any such company moved out of your state
as an apparent result of enactment of a discovery rule or revival statute
or been driven out of business as a result thereof?
Eighteen insurance departments in states with time-of-discovery rules replied with
the following results: seven states reported that they had "no knowledge of loss
of business or increase in premium" (Alabama, Delaware, Kansas, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Texas); one state reported "no loss of business or
increase in premiums" (Pennsylvania); six stated that they "don't know answers
to these questions" (Arizona, California, Maine, New Jersey, Tennessee, Wisconsin);
and four states were "not responsive to questions" (Arkansas, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri). Fact Sheet, supra note 261, at 3; see also supra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text for the statutes of limitations of these states.
Additionally, confirmed cases of asbestosis in New York State do not necessarily
indicate enormous potential legal liability for New York corporations. Between
March 1982 and March 1983, fifty-eight suspected and confirmed cases of asbestosis
were reported in Jefferson and St. Lawrence counties. State To Investigate Asbestosis
in 2 Counties, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1984, at A38, col. 1. However, only thirty-
five cases were reported in the rest of the state in 1983, including one in Manhattan.
Id. It seems illogical to argue that a business would leave a newly converted time-
of-discovery state in order to move to one of the few remaining minority time-
of-injury jurisdictions. Too many other factors would appear to govern a corporate
move. For example, a report prepared by a panel appointed by Governor Cuomo
stated that New York business executives surveyed believed that the personal income
tax was the "greatest single burden imposed by the state" primarily because labor
expenses constitute a large portion of business costs. Carroll, A Cuomo Panel
Plans to Suggest Income-Tax Cut, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1984, at B7, col. 4.
Arguably a corporation would weigh the benefits of proposed New York State
income tax changes quite heavily before planning to relocate. Id. at B7, col. 1.
In light of the trend towards the time-of-discovery rule, it is doubtful that a
corporation would risk relocation anyway, since any minority state could readily
become part of the time-of-discovery majority.
285. See supra notes 275-78 and accompanying text. Members of the Assembly
Codes Committee promptly reported their own compromise bill designed to afford
time-of-discovery and revival relief to asbestos, chlordane, diethylstilbestrol, po-
lyvinylchloride and tungsten-carbide claimants only. N.Y. A. 3593-B, 207 Reg. Sess.
(1983-1984); see also Assembly News, supra note 275, at 2. However, no action
was taken on any of the proposals. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 227-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Agent
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statute of limitations currently existing in CPLR section 214 should
include a broad one-year revival clause for plaintiffs whose claims
have been barred under the three year statute of limitations, as well
as by a requirement of actual injury and discovery of causation by
the plaintiff before the statute of limitations has begun to run.
288
Both provisions are essential to insure the most equitable legislative
solution to the problem posed by latent toxic injuries. Assembly bill
A. 3547-A contains these provisions and should be supported by
the full New York State Legislature in the future. 289 In light of the
New York State Legislature's failure to enact a time-of-discovery
rule for toxic tort plaintiffs in this session, the New York Court
of Appeals retains the power and bears the responsibility to exercise
its equitable discretion to provide judicial relief to time-barred toxic
tort plaintiffs. Such judicial relief has been provided in a majority
of states which have adopted a time-of-discovery statute of limitations
for all toxic tort cases. 290
For example, the Appellate Court of Illinois adopted a time-of-
discovery rule in latent disease cases in Nolan v. Johns-Manville
Asbestos & Magnesia Materials Co.291 In Nolan, an asbestos insulator,
who had installed asbestos products from 1941 to 1973, brought
suit in 1973 against the defendant for asbestosis contracted by the in-
sulator during this period.2 92 Under the Illinois two-year personal
injury statute of limitations, the plaintiff's claim would have been time-
barred.293 The defendant moved for summary judgment contending that
the time-of-discovery rule did not apply and, in the alternative, that
Orange legislative exception. See also O'Connor, The Toxic Torts Plaintiff and
Statute of Limitations, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 30, 1982, at 1, col. 2. Professor O'Connor
notes that enactment of a time-of-discovery rule would not unfairly burden de-
fendants because they are usually corporate entities which maintain records of
testing, marketing and manufacture of their products. Id. Professor O'Connor also
states that "simple justice" requires that defendants rather than plaintiffs bear the
cost in time-barred suits. Id. at 26, col. 2. Finally, he notes that it is absurd to
tell an injured plaintiff that he has a right of action but no remedy even though
he has just discovered his injury. Id. One of the statutory models Professor O'Connor
supports is CPLR § 214-a, the Agent Orange exception. Id.
288. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
289. Id.
290. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
291. 74 Ill. App. 3d 778, 392 N.E.2d 1352 (1979), aff'd, 85 111. 2d 161, 421
N.E.2d 864 (1981).
292. Id. at 780, 392 N.E.2d at 1354.
293. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 15 (Smith-Hurd 1977). The current Illinois personal
injury statute of limitations is codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-202 (Smith-
Hurd 1984).
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the plaintiff had not exercised due diligence to discover his injury
and its cause. 294
The Nolan court held, however, that a time-of-discovery accrual
rule must be applied in latent disease cases. 295 In so holding, the
court avoided judicial legislative problems by adopting the language
of an Illinois Supreme Court decision involving a worker's com-
pensation claim: "To say that the plaintiff must have filed suit at
the time of the first inhalation .. .means that an injury could not
. . . be proved. Such argument is unsound and does violence to
the manifest intent of the Legislature .... ,,296 The court also
held that the question of whether a plaintiff had exercised reasonable
diligence to discover that he had contracted asbestosis due to the
defendant's negligence, was a question for the trier of fact.219 The
defendant's motion for summary judgment, therefore, could not be
granted 298
A second example of a court adopting a time-of-discovery accrual
rule is found in Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp.2 9 9 In Louisville, a decedent asbestos worker had worked from
1957-1967 in a factory which processed asbestos boards manufactured
by the defendant.3°° The decedent had died in 1972 from malignant
mesothelioma diagnosed in 1971, which allegedly had been caused
by exposure to asbestos dust in the factory.30 The administrator of
the decedent's estate brought an action for personal injuries and
wrongful death against the defendant soon after the decedent's
death.30 2 The estate's action would have been time-barred by Ken-
tucky's one-year personal injury statute of limitations.3 3 The Supreme
294. 74 I11. App. 3d at 779, 392 N.E.2d at 1354.
295. Id. at 788, 392 N.E.2d at 1360.
[lit is clear that the statute of limitations in a case such as this, involving
a physical condition characteristically developing slowly and insidiously
over a long period of time ... necessitates more than a mere computation
or accrual of calendar days. Requiring the filing of a lawsuit before the
potentially serious consequences of exposure to a dangerous and defective
product can possibly be known or become known for a period ... of
... years, could destroy a just and meaningful claim for injuries simply
for want of knowledge or proof and thereby nullify any realistic redress
available to an injured party.
Id.
296. Id. at 788, 392 N.E.2d at 1360 (quoting Madison v. Wedron Silica Co.,
352 Ill. 60, 184 N.E. 901 (1933)).
297. 74 III. App. 3d at 794, 392 N.E.2d at 1364.
298. Id.
299. 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979).
300. Id. at 498.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.140(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1972 & Supp. 1984).
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Court of Kentucky, however, expressly overruled nearly twenty-five
years of judge-made law3°4 to extend Kentucky's medical malpractice
time-of-discovery rule to tort actions for latent disease injuries.3 °5
The estate's action, therefore, was held to have been timely filed.
30 6
Such holdings protect toxic tort plaintiffs from the harsh effects
of a time-of-injury statute of limitations rule. Proposed New York
State Assembly Bill A. 3547-A would have a similar effect.307 Ar-
guably, the New York State Court of Appeals should apply such
a standard judicially in the absence of legislative initiative to obtain
more equitable results.3°0 The court of appeals has already applied
a more equitable accrual rule in the related areas of medical mal-
practice in Flanagan3°9 and medical implants in Martin. 10 Now, it
is time to extend judicial protection to all plaintiffs suffering from
latent injuries.
VI. Conclusion
While the Martin decision liberalizes the statute of limitations
accrual rule in the case of malfunctioning medical implants it also
affirms New York's strict accrual rule for latent injury cases.3 '" In
order to provide plaintiffs suffering from latent disease an oppor-
tunity to file a timely claim, it is imperative that New York State
adopt a comprehensive time-of-discovery rule of accrual. The limited
legislative exception to the strict accrual rule provided for in Agent
Orange cases by CPLR section 214-b is not sufficient, particularly since
even the legislature has acknowledged the strong link between other
toxic substances and plaintiffs' injuries." 2 Yet, this limited exception
demonstrates that the legislature is aware of the problems latent-
injury plaintiffs face.
In light of the fact that a majority of jurisdictions accepts the
time-of-discovery rule at state3"3 and federal '14 levels, New York State
should adopt such a rule. Despite the New York Court of Appeals'
304. Columbus Mining Co. v. Walker, 271 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954).
305. 580 S.W.2d at 501.
306. Id.
307. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 184-226 and accompanying text for vigorous dissents which
advocate application of a more equitable judicial standard.
309. See supra notes 246-60 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 123-54 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text for discussion of the legislative
findings pertaining to DES.
313. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 53-88 and accompanying text.
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continued reluctance, this adoption could come from a judicial
decision since the court has already recognized a number of exceptions
to the strict accrual statute of limitations rule in related areas." 5
This "judge-made law" of strict accrual would then be "judge-
unmade" to afford victims of latent disease an opportunity to obtain
just compensation by providing for the running of the statute of
limitations from the time latent injury and the cause of the injury
are discovered by the toxic tort plaintiff.
Steven L. White
315. See supra notes 104-54, 246-60 and accompanying text.
